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I. INTRODUCTION
Jonathan Cilley and William Graves fought their duel in the
early afternoon of February 23, 1838.1 The two faced off near the
Anacostia River bridge leading out of Washington, D.C., having
1. LoRENzo SABINE, NOTEs ON DUELS AND DUELLING 97-101 (1856) (quoting a report from
the committee of the United States House of Representatives assigned to investigate the Cilley-
Graves duel). Sabine's book contains the entire report of the House Committee assigned to in-
vestigate the duel, id. at 91-108, as well as excerpts from the subsequent Senate debate over the
proposed anti-dueling bill for the District of Columbia, id. at 381-91. For a more recent historical
account of the duel that also draws on Sabine's account, see STEVEN STOWE, INT MACY AND
POWER IN THE OLD SOUTH: RITUAL IN THE LIVES OF THE PLANTERS 38-48 (1987).
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agreed in advance to duel with rifles at a distance of eighty paces. 2
Shortly before three o'clock, they stood opposite one another, and at
the signal, they exchanged shots, Cilley firing first.8 Both men
missed. The men who accompanied them to the duel-their sec-
onds-tried to work out the disagreement that led the men to the
dueling-ground, but to no avail.4 For a second time, both stood and
exchanged fire; for a second time, both missed. Now, Cilley was
ready to end the duel, but by this time Graves was enraged and in-
sisted on another exchange.5 The two men's seconds backed away
again, the signal was given again, and the men exchanged fire once
more. This time, Cilley dropped to the ground, shot dead.6
The duel and its result quickly attracted national attention,
for the two duelists were not just gentlemen skirmishing over a pri-
vate slight, but United States Congressmen-Cilley from Maine,
Graves from Kentucky. 7 So were six of the witnesses at the duel.8
The outcry grew when Graves and the other Congressmen were not
immediately expelled from Congress, but instead merely made the
subject of an investigation.9
As word of the duel and its outcome spread, Congress was
bombarded with petitions demanding that it pass a law banning
dueling in the District of Columbia, even though dueling was al-
ready illegal under the common law. 10 Within two weeks of Cilley's
death, Senator Samuel Prentiss of Maine put before the Senate a
bill "[T]o prohibit the giving or accepting within the District of Co-
lumbia of a challenge to fight a duel."" The bill would make send-
2. SABINE, supra note 1, at 97.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 97-98.
6. Id. at 98-100.
7. Despite their elected offices, Cilley and Graves were not dueling over direct political dif-
ferences, but a fairly trivial slight, which occurred when Cilley refused to accept a letter from a
newspaper publisher that Graves was merely carrying. See STOWE, supra note 1, at 40-41.
8. The House report identified the men as Reps. Crittenden and Menefee of Kentucky;
Wise of Virginia; Duncan of Ohio; Bynum of North Carolina; and Jones of Wisconsin. SABINE,
supra note 1, at 89.
9. Graves was later censured by the House, but it refused to expel him, and none of the
other Congressmen present at the duel were punished for their role. See DON C. SEITZ, FAMOUS
AMERICAN DUELS 277-78 (1929).
10. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 231 (1838) (petition of citizens of Rocking-
ham, Vermont, calling on Congress to pass a law suppressing dueling); CONG. GLOBE, 25th
Cong., 2d Sess. 233 (1838) (petition of citizens of Sullivan County, New York, calling on Congress
to expel Congressmen involved with the Cilley-Graves duel).
11. CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 2d Sess. 206 (1838).
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ing a challenge a felony punishable by five years imprisonment, and
would make killing an opponent in a duel murder.
On the Senate floor, however, the bill met a mixed response.
Senators from Northern states, where dueling had largely died out,
strongly supported the ban.13 Southern senators, however, repre-
senting the region where dueling still flourished, voiced doubts. A
few simply did not believe dueling should be outlawed. Arkansas
Senator Ambrose Sevier argued that dueling was often necessary,
and that "nine out of every ten [duels] were fought for causes that
could not be got over any other way."1 4
Even Senators who professed to abhor dueling argued that
the law would do little good. Anti-dueling laws were on the books
in all states, but often ignored. Public opinion supported dueling,
and until this changed the law would be a dead letter. "What com-
munity, .. ." asked Missouri Sen. Lewis Linn, "would pronounce a
man either a murder[er] or a felon, who might chance to kill an-
other in a fair fight?"15 William Preston of South Carolina agreed,
pointing out that the reason the common law had not stopped du-
eling was "a state of public opinion ... which was averse to the
stern execution of the law applicable to dueling."16 Seeking a mid-
dle ground, a few Senators suggested weakening the proposed law's
penalties, arguing that a less punitive measure stood a better
chance of being enforced; but their proposals were not accepted. 17
The last Senator to speak on the bill was Henry Clay of Ken-
tucky, who acknowledged that the law would likely have little ef-
fect. Dueling was ill ?gal everywhere, yet it was not the law that
decided whether met.. l'eled, but public sentiment.18 In the North,
where public opinion opposed dueling, men did not duel; in the
South, where dueling was the norm, men dueled, or else risked
"having the finger of scorn pointed at them."19 Clay nonetheless
supported the bill, chiefly because he hoped it might alter the "state
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., SABINE, supra note 1, at 384-85 (statements of Senators from Vermont and
Connecticut in strong support of the anti-dueling bill).
14. Id. at 389.
15. Id. at 384-85.
16. Id. at 387.
17. Id. at 386. One alternative punishment favored by several Senators was a permanent
ban from public office for any person convicted of dueling, a proposal modeled after several state
laws that, Senators claimed, had helped deter dueling. See id. For skepticism on whether such
state laws were effective, see infra text accompanying notes 194-197.
18. SABINE, supra note 1, at 390.
19. Id.
2001] 1807
VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW
of the public mind" on dueling. 20 But, he concluded, only when
"public opinion was renovated, and chastened by reason, religion,
and humanity, [would] the practice of dueling be . . . discounte-
nanced."21
In the end, the Bill to suppress dueling in the District of
Columbia passed the Senate by a vote of 34-1.22 Though it died in
the House that year, it was introduced again the next year and be-
came law in February, 1839.23 In retrospect, the law appears to
have done little to end dueling.2 4
The Cilley-Graves duel and the ensuing debate over anti-
dueling laws attracted only brief attention during the 1830s, and
both the duel and the resulting law were soon forgotten. But the
duel and the debate can illuminate legal and social issues still of
profound interest. Dueling was against the common law, but two
Congressmen dueled without worry they would be punished for
their acts.25 Lawmakers claimed to oppose dueling, but stated that
laws would do no good in the face of determined public opinion. In
modern terms, the debate over anti-dueling laws embodied the ten-
sions between law and social norms.
II. SOCIAL NORMS AND DUELING
The story of dueling and attempts to suppress it can easily
become a parable-a tale from which we draw a lesson.26 To some
hearing the tale, the lesson might be the need to stand fast in the
face of public opinion; for others, the weakness of the law in the
face of determined men. More recently, however, a group of legal
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 391. The one Senator voting "No" was Sevier of Arkansas. Id.
23. CONG. GLOBE, 25th Cong., 3d Sess., 181-82 (1839).
24. JOYCE APPLEBY, INHERITING THE REVOLUTION: THE FIRST GENERATION AFTER THE
REVOLUTION 45 (2000).
25. Actually, many of the nation's politicians dueled. Among the many who dueled in this
era were not only Cilley and Graves, but two future presidents, Andrew Jackson and Abraham
Lincoln, and two founding fathers, Vice-President Aaron Burr and former Secretary of tho
Treasury Alexander Hamilton, in a famous 1804 duel, and two other vice-presidents, William
Crawford and Henry Clay. See ROBERT BALDICK, THE DUEL: A HISTORY OF DUELING 120-24
(1965); WILLIAM OLIVER STEVENS, PISTOLS AT TEN PACES: THE STORY OF THE CODE OF HONOR IN
AMERICA 37, 47 (1940). In 1817, the Attorney General of the United States, William Wirt, chal-
lenged his predecessor, William Pinckney, to a duel, which was averted only after Pincknoy
apologized for any perceived slight. See ANDREW BURSTEIN, AMERICA'S JUBILEE: HOW IN 1826 A
GENERATION REMEMBERED FIFTY YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE 47-48 (2001).
26. See, e.g., STOWE, supra note 1, at 48-49 (using the Cilley-Graves duel to interpret the so-
cial meanings of the duel).
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scholars has drawn a particular lesson about law and social change
from dueling, laws against it, and its eventual demise.2 7 To borrow
their terminology, the rise of anti-dueling legislation and the end of
dueling illustrates how over time law can change "social norms."2s
These scholars note that at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, "public prejudice" demanded that a gentleman either de-
fend his honor in a duel or else sacrifice the respect of his peers.29
Yet at the end of that same century, the vast majority of people
would have been horrified were a gentleman to engage in a duel to
defend his honor.30 The "social norm" about dueling-the consensus
about what a gentleman ought to do to defend his honor and the
consensus about what refusing a duel would mean-had changed.
Pinning down a definition of "social norm!' is not an easy
task. Legal scholars studying social norms have advanced a series
of related definitions.3' To simplify,3 2 most scholars seem to agree
that a social norm is a "social regularity," a behavior that is in fact
widely adopted in society.33 What distinguishes these social regu-
larities as social norms is that they are not only what people do, but
what society holds that people should do.34 The particular actions
constituting a social norm have larger cultural or social meanings,
which lead other members of society to approve or disapprove of
27. See infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
28. Scholars studying social norms are not a monolithic group, but Professor Lawrence Les-
sig has dubbed the group of social norms scholars based at the University of Chicago the "New
Chicago SchooL" Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School. 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998).
For other useful surveys of the new social norms literature, see ERIC POSNER, L.01 AND SOCIAL
NORIS 11-35 (2000); Richard I-. McAdams, Accounting for Norms, 1997 WISC. L, REv. 625, 631-
36; Eric Posner, Efficient Norms, in 2 NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LNI
19 (Peter Newman ed., 1999); Mark Tushnet, "Everything Old is New Again. Early Reflections
on the "New Chicago School," 1998 WIS. L. REV. 579, 579-81; and Jeffrey Rosen, The Social Po-
lice, NEW YORKER, Oct. 20 & 27, 1997, at 170 (presenting an informed journalistic account). A
foundation work of the law and social norms literature is ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER
WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
29. The most influential statement of this parable is Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 968-72 (1995).
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 587
(1998) ("I place 'social' before 'norm' to indicate a consensus in a community concerning what
people ought to do."); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms,
96 MICH_ L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (stating that the new norms literature defines norms as "infor-
mal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of
duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both"); see also POSTER, supra note 28,
at 11-35.
32. Readers should be aware that social norms scholarship remains a contentious field and
any rough generalization about "what scholars who study social norms think' is just that-a
generalization.
33. McAdams, supra note 31, at 340.
34. See Lessig, supra note 28, at 662.
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them.35 The meanings attached to a social norm cause members of
society to feel obliged to conform to social norms, either because the
meaning has become internalized or because to do otherwise would
risk sanction from other members of society.3 6 The legal scholar
Lawrence Lessig summarized well the workings of social norms
when he wrote:
Social norms regulate .... They frown on the racist's joke; they tell the stranger to
tip a waiter at a highway diner; they are unsure about whether a man should hold
a door open for a woman. Norms constrain the individual's behavior, but not
through the centralized enforcement of a state. If they constrain, they constrain
because of the enforcement of a community. 37
For the purposes of this Note, it suffices to say that dueling fits
within several of the definitions offered for a social norm. Dueling
was prevalent in pre-Civil War Southern upper-class society.3 8 Par-
ticipating in a duel communicated to others-it meant-that the
duelists were men of honor.3 9 Duelists felt compelled by internal
and external pressures to duel. 40
Dueling and the legal campaign against it are particularly
interesting to scholars who seek not merely to understand social
norms, but to change them. 41 Some scholars believe that attention
to social norms can yield valuable new ways to combat undesirable
social practices. They target behaviors that are harmful, from
35. See id. at 680 C(rhe cost (whether internal or external) of deviating from a social norm is
not constituted by the mere deviation from a certain behavior; it is a cost in part constituted by
the meaning of deviating from a certain behavior."). For more complete discussions of the com-
plexity of social meaning, see generally Lessig, supra note 29; Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence,
Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997).
36. Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanc-
tions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 134 (1996) (referring to norms as simply "non-
legal sanctions"); see also Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 537, 540 (1998) (referring to social norms as informal systems of external social
control).
37. Lessig, supra note 28, at 662.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 134-61.
39. See infra text accompanying notes 141-51.
40. See, e.g., JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, THE MILiTANT SOUTH 1800-1861, at 48-49 (1956) (dis-
cussing intense social pressures on men to duel); STOWE, supra note 1, at 15-23 (discussing con-
nections between honor, dueling, and self-esteem).
41. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 31, at 586 (analyzing how law can change social norms);
Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 607, 608 (2000) (stating that, while some believe law is a "relatively ineffective instrument
for changing social norms," the real problem is "the primitive state of our understanding of how
law and norms interac'); Lessig, supra note 28, at 661 CThe new school identifies alternatives
as additional tools for a more effective activism... [t]he hope of the new [Chicago School] is that
the state can do more."); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 907 (1996) ("(Njorm management is an important strategy for accomplishing the objectives
of the law.").
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smoking to date rape to white collar crime, and look for legal sanc-
tions that will not merely punish perpetrators after the fact, but
which will attach unfavorable meanings to the targeted activity,
and so enlist social pressures to alter the behavior. 42
In search of such properly crafted laws, these scholars have
looked to the anti-dueling laws passed in nineteenth-century
America. Dueling has rapidly become an exemplar of the kind of
undesirable social norm that can be altered through careful legal
planning.F In this telling, anti-dueling laws gained their greatest
force not from the fines or imprisonment they threatened.44 Rather,
they deterred dueling because they threatened a duelist's honor.45
One punishment anti-dueling laws meted out was to bar du-
elists from elective office. 46 Such a punishment promised to deter
dueling in two ways. First, it offered gentlemen who only dueled in
response to social pressures a way to defect from the prevailing
norm.47 Faced with a duel, these men could refuse by arguing that a
gentleman's first duty was to occupy the positions of leadership the
law denied duelists.48 Second, the laws provided a powerful disin-
centive even to men who had internalized the dueling norm, for a
bar from public office would be a stain on their honor.4 9 Rather than
accept such shame, these men too might avoid dueling.
There is a strange feature about the recent attention paid to
anti-dueling laws. Most scholars acknowledge that the laws, how-
ever cleverly designed, did not eliminate dueling. 0 Despite this,
they still recommend anti-dueling laws as a model for laws that aim
not merely to punish wrongdoing, but to change the social norms
about undesirable activities.5 '
42. See, eg., Katherine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L REV. 663, 701 (1999)
(suggesting that laws designed to shame date rapists could draw on the lessons of anti-dueling
laws); Dan Kahan & Eric Posner, Shaming White.Collar Criminal& A Proposal for Reform of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L & ECON. 365, 368-72 (1999).
43. See Lessig, supra note 29, at 968-71.
44. See id. at 971-73.
45. See id.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 164-83.
47. See Lessig, supra note 29, at 972-73.
48. See id.
49. This second use of disfranchisement, as a shaming penalty for duelists, is not suggested
by Lessig, but by Karen Baker, see Baker, supra note 42, at 701, but I think it consistent with
Lessig's general point. On shaming sanctions generally, see Dan M. Kahan, What Do Shaming
Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Ci. L. REV. 591 (1996).
50. See Lessig, supra note 29, at 970. But see Tushnet, supra note 28, at 579 (citing anti-
dueling laws as a successful program to end dueling); Rosen, supra note 28, at 178 (same).
51. See Paul K. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 839 (2000)
(describing dueling as "an example of suboptimality much beloved in the legal literature of
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It is these kinds of laws, designed not merely to penalize
wrongdoers, but to hold them up for disapproval, shame or ridicule,
that appeal to contemporary scholars. 52 Thus, anti-smoking cam-
paigns are proposed that do not merely ban smoking but which
communicate social disapproval of the practice. 53 Date rapists and
white-collar criminals should, scholars suggest, face "shame" sanc-
tions.5 4 In this vision, laws targeted at the "social meanings" that
attach to social norms are levers by which lawmakers can move the
world.
This Note approaches anti-dueling laws within the contem-
porary debates over social norms. The Note's primary goal is simply
to examine how anti-dueling laws actually affected dueling in pre-
Civil War America, as a case study in how laws can affect social
norms. Dueling has existed in some legally tolerated or even en-
couraged form in many western societies for most of the past mil-
lennium. 55 Duels were commonplace in Renaissance Italy and in
Germany and Austria-Hungary in the early twentieth century.5 6
America is no exception; duels can be found in the historical record
from the 1620s to the early twentieth century. 5 Yet today the duel
as a socially accepted, formal combat for honor has almost disap-
peared, and its decline coincided with the development of a series of
laws designed to shame duelists and render this "affair of honor" a
dishonorable practice. This coincidence, however, does not answer
the question of whether the laws actually ended dueling.
This Note examines anti-dueling laws, and the end of duel-
ing in the nineteenth-century United States. Section III examines
the legal prohibitions laid on dueling in the common law, statutes,
and state constitutions in England and America. Section IV focuses
on the antebellum South, and asks whether these legal rules and
proscriptions had any significant effect on the practice of dueling.
Section V discusses the reasons why dueling ended in the years af-
ter 1860, and suggests a few lessons that scholars can learn from
this historical example.
norms"); Tushnet, supra note 28, at 583 (describing the example of anti.dueling laws as "an
example commonly offered to explain the attractions of the New Chicago School's approach").
52. See Baker, supra note 42, at 701.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 319-22,
54. See Baker, supra note 42, at 693.706 (date rape); Kahan & Posner, supra note 42, at
380-83 (white-collar crime).
55. See V. G. KIERNAN, THE DUEL IN EUROPEAN HISTORY: HONOUR AND THE REIGN OF
ARIsTOcRACY passim (1988).
56. See id.
57. See infra Parts III, IV.
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III. DUELING AND THE LAW
Dueling was an established custom in Europe since the six-
teenth century.58 It was chiefly the province of upper-class men,
usually aristocrats who sought in the duel to demonstrate their
personal bravery, skill, and honor.5 9 Because the duel was preemi-
nently a forum where an individual demonstrated his own qualities
to his peers, it was the antithesis of the legal process. In a duel, a
man defended his own honor; the law, in contrast, placed judgment
in the hands of others.60 Perhaps because of this, dueling has al-
ways been at odds with the law.61
Dueling had been illegal under the Common Law since be-
fore England settled her American colonies.6 Unlike continental
European legal codes, which classified dueling as an offense sepa-
rate from murder and which generally meted out light punishment
to duelists, 63 the common law slotted dueling into well-established
categories of criminal law.6 A would-be duelist, who merely chal-
lenged another to duel, was held to have committed incitement; du-
elists who fought, but both of whom survived, would be tried for
assault; and in the case of a duel where one combatant died, the
survivor was held guilty of either manslaughter or murder.6 While
not universally obeyed, the laws were frequently enforced. In seven-
teenth- and eighteenth-century England, duelists were haled before
Courts and, sometimes, convicted and imprisoned.6
Nevertheless, by no means were all duelists punished. Aris-
tocrats frequently avoided being charged with any crimes related to
their duels, while even when charges were leveled at duelists, Eng-
58. See KIERNAN, supra note 55, ch. 1.
59. See Julian Pitt-Rivers, Honor, 6 INVL ENCYCLOPEDIA SOC. SCi. 503, 503-10 (1968). The
duel was a signal to observers that the duelists were worthy of honor, and contemporary scholars
have argued that social norms have important "signaling" functions. See POSNER, supra note 28,
at 18-22.
60. Pitt-Rivers, supra note 59, at 509.
61. See id.
62. See IV WLLI.mi BLACKSTONE, COMIENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *145, *199
(1768); 3 JAMES FITWJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99-102
(1883).
63. See UTE FREVERT, MEN OF HONOR: A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE DUEL 31
(1995).
64. See STEPHEN, supra note 62, at 100-02.
65. See IV BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *199; STEPHEN, supra note 62, at 100.
66. See STEPHEN, supra note 62, at 100.
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lish juries or judges were sometimes unwilling to convict the com-
batants. 67
In eighteenth-century England, anti-dueling laws were at
war with popular sentiment. As Blackstone himself admitted, one
reason dueling survived was because too many people believed that
a duel was the only way for a gentleman to affirm his honor. 68 Even
in the face of legal sanction, Blackstone wrote, desire for honor and
fear for their reputations would drive many men to the dueling-
grounds: "[For] it requires such a degree of passive valour, to com-
bat the dread of even undeserved contempt, arising from the false
notions of honour too generally received in Europe, that the strong-
est prohibitions and penalties of the law will never be [e]ntirely ef-
fectual to eradicate this unhappy custom." 69 This summed up the
dilemma of laws prohibiting dueling: while sometimes enforced, the
laws were alone insufficient to eliminate the practice so long as the
people enforcing the laws did not abhor dueling.
When the English began to settle North America, they
brought with them the common law and its prohibitions against
dueling.70 Especially considering how popular dueling became in the
nineteenth-century, it is surprising to realize that only a handful of
duels took place in English America between 1620 and 1760, and
that in these rare instances duelists were usually punished. In
1652, for instance, a Virginia settler, Richard Dunham, challenged
a fellow colonist to a duel.71 For this breach of the peace Dunham
received a public whipping.72
In the years after 1700, such rough justice was no longer
enough to suppress dueling. The more settled nature of colonial life,
and the more regular contacts between the colonies and England,
led a few Americans to ape the practices of the British aristocracy,
including dueling. In Boston, socially prominent young men fought
duels in 1718 and 1728.73 In response, Massachusetts' House of
67. See, e.g., KIERNAN, supra note 55, at 167-68; see also STEPHEN, supra note 62, at 100
(discussing a 1688 case where an English jury wanted to find a particularly ruthless duelist
guilty of murder, but was thwarted by sympathetic judges who changed the charge to man-
slaughter).
68. IV BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *199.
69. Id.
70. See ARTHUR P. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 179 (1930); Evarts B.
Greene, The Code of Honor in Colonial and Revolutionary Times, XXVI PUBLICATIONS OF THE
COLONIAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS 370-71 (1927).
71. See SCOTT, supra note 70, at 179.
72. See id.
73. See SEITZ, supra note 9, at 48-51; Greene, supra note 70, at 371-73. The 1718 duel, in
which no one was hurt, was between a British Army captain, Thomas Smart, and the governor's
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Delegates passed statutes setting harsher punishments for
duelists.74 The 1718 statute provided that, even in a duel in which
no one was injured, the duelists were still liable for a £100 fine and
six months' imprisonment. 75
This law did not work as well as the legislature may have
hoped, for in 1728 Boston saw another duel in which one combatant
died.76 In response, the colony's House adopted a new kind of law,
one that aimed not only to punish duelists but also to cut the link
between dueling and honor. The law was an early attempt to
change dueling's social meaning. It provided that, if a man either
made a challenge for a duel or accepted a challenge, even if the duel
was never held, he was to be "carried publicly in a cart to the gal-
lows, with a rope about his neck, and sit on the gallows for one
hour," exposed to public ridicule.77 Following this he would be im-
prisoned for a year.78 Were the duel to prove fatal, the surviving
duelist was to be executed for "willful murder."79 Then, in a pun-
ishment designed to drive home the ignominy of dueling, his body
would be treated as the body of a suicide: buried without a coffin
with a stake through his heart.80 The legislature's twofold message
was clear: duelists would be treated like suicides both because they
deserved as little respect as did suicides, and also because in impor-
tant respects dueling was suicidal.8' These harsh prohibitions, how-
ever, were never enforced.82
Despite such laws, dueling began to gain favor in British
North America in the 1760s. 8 3 A variety of changes in colonial soci-
private secretary, John Boydell See id The 1728 duel was between scions of two of the city's
most prominent families, Henry Phillips and Benjamin Woodbridge. See id. Woodbridge was
killed in the duel, but Phillips was spirited out of the city before he could be punished. See id.
74. See Greene, supra note 70, at 373 (quoting 2 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 135).
75. See id. (quoting 2 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 517-18).
76. See id. at 374-75.
77. Id. at 375 (quoting 2 ACTS AND RESOLVES OF THE MACHUSETrS HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 517-18).
78. See id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. See id. Suicide was considered a particularly heinous crime in early modem England,
as it appeared to take the prerogative of giving life and death from God. Thus, equating dueling
and suicide was a harsh judgment and permanent stain on one's memory. See MICHAEL
MACDONALD & TERENCE R. MURPHY, SLEEPLESS SOULS: SUICIDE IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND
19, 128-54 (1990); STEPHEN, supra note 62, at 105.
82. See Greene, supra note 70, at 375.
83. See Bruce C. Baird, The Social Origins of Dueling in Virginia, in LTHAL IIAcINATIo:4:
VIOLENCE AND BRUTALITY IN AmRICAN HISTORY 88.90 (Michael Bellesiles ed., 1999).
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ety contributed to the new acceptability of the duel. For one, large
numbers of settlers from a new immigrant group, the Scotch-Irish,
arrived in the New World and settled in the backcountry that
stretched from Pennsylvania to North Carolina.84 Coming to Amer-
ica from the wild and lawless borderlands of Great Britain and
Ireland, the Scotch-Irish brought with them the belief that private
violence was an acceptable way to settle disputes outside the
courts.85 The acceptance of private violence could only have encour-
aged dueling. 86 The 1760s also saw the beginning of the conflicts
that would end in the American Revolution. As elites fought over
the future of the English colonies, older habits of cooperation began
to break down.87 Further contributing to the rise of dueling was the
fact that many of the disputants in colonial politics had, unlike pre-
vious generations, been educated in England, where some had
learned dueling as one way the English aristocracy settled conflicts
outside the courts.88
The greatest spur to dueling in America, however, was the
Revolution itself. The War brought to America British and French
armies officered by aristocrats with traditions of dueling. 89 At the
same time, it created a new and as yet undefined role for many
American gentlemen-that of officer in the Colonial army.90 Newly-
minted American officers found it necessary to communicate to both
their fellow officers and subordinates that they were gentlemen de-
serving of respect.91 One place to publicly demonstrate their gentil-
ity and status was in a duel.9 2 In 1778, two generals in the new
United States Army fought a duel, and a year later one writer com-
plained that dueling had become "in vogue" with officers of the Con-
tinental Army.93
84. See id. at 92-95. See generally DAVID HACKETT FISHER, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRITISH
FOLKWAYS IN NORTH AMERICA 623-29 (1989) (discussing the Scotch-Irish diaspora and the now
settlers' notions of socially acceptable violence).
85. See FISHER, supra note 84, at 769.
86. That is not to say that the immigration caused dueling, just to point out that dueling
could flourish better in a society that tolerated high levels of violence. See id. at 766-71.
87. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 83, at 95-97 (discussing a rising level of violence as basic con.
flicts over the colonists' political loyalties came to the fore in the 1760s).
88. See id. at 101-02.
89. See KIERNAN, supra note 55, at 112-15.
90. See CHARLES ROYSTER, A REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AT WAR: THE CONTINENTAL ARMY
AND AMERICAN CHARACTER, 1775-1783, at 207-10 (1979).
91. See id.
92. See STEVENS, supra note 25, at 14-16.
93. ROYSTER, supra note 90, at 209; see also BEN C. TRUMAN, THE FIELD OF HONOR: A
COMPLETE AND COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF DUELING IN ALL COUNTRIES 260 (1884); Greene,
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With the new craze for dueling came new legal attempts to
halt it. The first Articles of War passed by the Continental Con-
gress in 1775 adopted the British Army code's ban against
dueling.9 4 That measure, however, was apparently ineffectual, for
within a year the Congress found it necessary to pass a stronger
measure. The revised Article VII of the new nation's Code of War
was designed not only to ban dueling but also to protect the honor
of those who refused to duel. The statute stated that:
We hereby acquit and discharge all officers and soldiers from any disgrace or
Opinion of Disadvantage which might arise from their having refused to accept of
challenges, as they will only have acted in obedience to Our Orders, and done their
duty as good soldiers, who subject themselves to Discipline.s
Yet even in the 1770s dueling had its defenders. Article VII
passed the Continental Congress only over the strenuous objection
of South Carolina delegate Edmund Rutledge, who argued that du-
eling, far from being injurious to the military, was "a measure that
tended to make officers Gentlemen."95 Nor is it clear that changes
in the Articles of War significantly affected dueling.97
The problem, as contemporaries well knew, was that dueling
had become a prime means to publicly demonstrate one's status as
a gentleman. To end dueling, the law would have to render dueling
dishonorable. In 1779, Thomas Jefferson proposed such a law in
Virginia while he was in the process of preparing a revised legal
code for his home state. Jefferson's proposed law provided that du-
eling be outlawed, and whoever killed an opponent be guilty of
murder. 98 But like Massachusetts lawmakers of 50 years before, he
also wanted the law to counter the public acclaim sought by duel-
ists.99 He provided that, if the killer had been the one who insti-
gated the duel, his body was to be left on the gallows after death,
exposed for all to see. 100 The future president even entertained the
idea that the deceased duelist's estates should be confiscated, as
supra note 70, at 379 (noting that dueling in the Continental Army was more widespread than
once thought).
94. See Greene, supra note 70, at 379.
95. Id. at 377 (quoting the Articles of War).
96. Id. at 378.
97. See ROYSTER, supra note 90, at 209 (noting the popularity of dueling in the Continental
Army throughout the Revolutionary War).
98. See Greene, supra note 70, at 385.
99. See id. (stating that Jefferson's lav "reminds one of the Massachusetts law of 1728 in
pursuing the offender after death!).
100. The law read: "Whoever committeth murder by way of duel, shall suffer death by hang-
ing; and if he were the challenger, his body, after death, shall be gibbeted." Id. Ever the perfec-
tionist, Jefferson made sure the law included misdemeanor punishments for anyone who took the
duellists body from the gibbet. See id.
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was the law with suicides in England; for, Jefferson reasoned, was
not the unsuccessful duelist "equally guilty with a suicide"?101 His
law aimed to both punish the duelist and destroy his reputation.
Jefferson's proposed law never passed, however, and for at
least the next twenty years dueling would become an acceptable
custom in both the North and the South. 102 There were important
differences between the kinds of duels that predominated in those
regions. To be sure, men from both regions dueled for "honor" and
to maintain their standing in the eyes of others. In the North, how-
ever, duels were usually fought over political issues, between men
who claimed positions of political leadership. 0 3 In the South, duels
were fought over politics, but also over personal slights, between
men who saw the duel as a way to maintain their standing in soci-
ety. 104
Dueling in the North cannot be understood apart from the
political dynamics of the early republic.105 In the first few decades of
the United States, there were no mass political parties holding the
loyalties of voters across states or regions. 10 6 A voter might claim
some personal tie to, say, Alexander Hamilton, but he would think
it nonsensical to describe himself as a follower of the Federalist
Party. 0 7 Ties between politicians and their followers were thus in-
tensely personal, linked to the character of the politician. 108 In an
era of venomous personal politics, invective flowed freely and in-
101. Id.
102. See STEVENS, supra note 25, at 19.
103. For the most insightful analysis of dueling in the early Republic, see Joanne B. Free-
man, Dueling as Politics: Reinterpreting the Burr-Hamilton Duel, 53 WM. & MARY Q. 289, 294-95
(1996) [hereinafter Freeman, Dueling as Politics]. My understanding of the North's political duel
is deeply indebted to Freeman's work. See id.; see also Joanne B. Freeman, Grappling with the
Character Issue, 28 REVS. AM. HIST. 518 (2000) [hereinafter Freeman, Grappling with the Char-
acter Issue]; Joanne B. Freeman, The Election of 1800: A Study in the Logic of Political Change,
108 YALE L.J. 1959, 1982-86 (1999) [hereinafter Freeman, Election of 1800].
104. See EDWARD L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-
CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH 9-33 (1984); BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS
AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH 349-61 (1982).
105. See Freeman, Dueling as Politics, supra note 103, at 293. So important was the political
duel's communicative function that the leading scholar of the institution described the duel as
constituting a "grammar of political combat." Id.
106. See Freeman, Election of 1800, supra note 103, at 1983-86.
107. Indeed, in the popular discourse loyalty to a "party" was equated with loyalty to a "fac-
tion," and loyalty to a particular group was seen as the antithesis of loyalty to the nation. This
explains why in his farewell address in 1797, George Washington warned his countrymen
against the "dangers of parties." George Washington, Farewell Address, reprinted in GEORGE
WASHINGTON: WRITINGS 969 (John Rhodehamer ed., Library of America 1997).
108. See Freeman, Dueling as Politics, supra note 103, at 294-95.
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sults to one's honor were easy to find.109 It was in this context that
the political duel flourished in the North.
By participating in a duel, specifically a duel with a political
opponent, a politician displayed to his followers that he valued his
principles more than his life. 10 The duel thus served to cement the
personal ties that were so important to politics in the early Repub-
lic."1 Refusing to participate in a duel sent the opposite message:
that the politician valued his own skin more than the principles he
professed, and was not worthy of political or personal loyalty.11 2
Lest this seem to make politics a real blood sport, one should re-
member that most "affairs of honor" were resolved before a duel,
and in most duels no one died. 13
The early Republic's political duel is captured in the famous
1804 duel between Aaron Burr, then Vice-President of the United
States, and former Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton.1 4 Their duel was over a comment made in a political
campaign, specifically a report that Hamilton had called the Vice-
President "a dangerous man, and one that ought not to be
trusted."11 5
The Burr-Hamilton duel was fought, furthermore, solely to
preserve the men's political standing. On the night before the duel,
Hamilton wrote a brief letter to family and friends, trying to justify
the duel." 6 There were, he admitted, many good reasons not to
duel: he had a wife and children, was deeply in debt, bore Burr no
personal ill-will and, not the least, dueling was condemned by both
the law of New York and his Christian religion.11 7 Yet however
many reasons there might be to refuse the duel, Hamilton wrote, he
109. See APPLEBY, supra note 24, at 43.
110. See THOMAS FLEMING, DUEL: ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AARON BURR, AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICA 7 (1999).
111. See Freeman, Grappling with the Character Issue, supra note 103, at 518-19.
112. See id.
113. Scholars' estimates of deaths in actual duels range from a 20% fatality rate to below
10%. See FLEMING, supra note 110, at 8; KENNETH S. GREENBERG, MASTERS AND STATESMEN:
THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 32 (1985).
114. For a detailed account of the Burr-Hamilton duel, see JOSEPH ELLS, FOUNDING
BROTHERS: THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION 20-48 (2000); see also FLF.fNG, supra note 110,
passim (1999); Freeman, Dueling as Politics, supra note 103, at 289-96; W.J. Rorabaugh, The
Political Duel in the Early Republic.: Burr v. Hamilton, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 1, 1-6 (1995).
115. FLEMING, supra note 110, at 275 (quoting American Citizen (Albany, NY), June 4, 1804).
116. See Freeman, supra note 103, at 291-92.
117. The story of Hamilton's last letter has been recounted in several essays. See Freeman,
Dueling as Politics, supra note 103, at 291-92; see also ROBERT AXELROD, An Evolutionary Ap-
proach to Norms, in THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED MODELS OF COMPETITION
AND COLLABORATION 44-45 (1997).
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felt a pressing necessity "not to decline the call." 18 To refuse the
challenge would have cost Hamilton the political support on which
his ambitions depended. 119 "[M]y ability to be in the future useful,
whether in resisting mischief or effecting good, in those crises of our
public affairs," he wrote, "would probably be inseparable from a
conformity with public prejudice in this particular."120 And so Ham-
ilton went to the dueling-ground, was shot through the side by
Burr, and died the next day.121
Despite the "public prejudices" demanding dueling, however,
dueling would have a relatively brief career in the North. In part,
this was due to the Burr-Hamilton duel. 122 Before 1804, many
Northerners had at least tolerated dueling. 123 Hamilton's death,
however, sparked a backlash against the practice, perhaps because
of his relative youth, the widow and small children he left behind,
or his public image as Washington's gallant aide-de-camp. 12 4 And as
public sentiment turned against dueling, so did the law. After the
duel, New York officials dusted off their state's long-neglected anti-
dueling laws and brought charges against Burr and Hamilton's sec-
onds, the men who arranged the duel. The seconds lost their voting
rights as punishment for their roles. 125 Burr, who fled New York
and New Jersey in fear of a murder indictment, would never again
be a force in the young nation's politics. 126
In the years following the duel, Northern public opinion
turned permanently against dueling, and the practice nearly disap-
peared in the North. The last major duel in Massachusetts, for in-
stance, was fought in 1806.127
While public outrage over Hamilton's death was one factor in
dueling's decline, deeper social changes also worked to turn public
opinion decisively against dueling. In politics, dueling was rendered
118. Freeman, Dueling as Politics, supra note 103, at 293.
119. Id.
120. Id. Hamilton's worry was not an idle one. Years later, John Quincy Adams speculated
that if Hamilton had "decline[d] to meet Colonel Burr, some doubt at least of his personal intre.
pidity would be entertained by men of military mind. He could no longer expect to be the favor.
ite candidate for the chief military command." FLEMING, supra note 110, at 304 (quoting JOHN
QUINCYADAMS, DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM 169).
121. ELLIS, supra note 114, at 30.
122. See FLEMING, supra note 110; Freeman, Dueling as Politics, supra note 103, at 296.
123. See generally Freeman, Dueling as Politics, supra note 103.
124. See Rorabaugh, supra note 114, at 19-20.
125. See FLEMING, supra note 110, at 370.
126. Rorabaugh, supra note 114, at 18-19.
127. See MICHAEL S. HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND AUTHORITY IN
MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878, at 42 (1980).
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superfluous by the growth of strong national political parties,
whose leaders no longer needed to keep the personal loyalty of
party members. Men now gave their allegiance not to individuals,
but to a party.128 The growth in the North of a mobile, commercial
society also worked against dueling. 12 9 People who succeeded in this
new society valued its openness and opportunities, and conse-
quently looked down on such "aristocratic" pretentions as
dueling. °30 In such a society it was easier to enforce anti-dueling
laws, but also less necessary.
IV. DUELING AND ANTI-DUELING IN THE ANTEBELLUM
SOUTH
A. The South's 'Affair of Honor"
In the South, dueling did not fade away. On the contrary, in
the early 1800s the duel developed into one of the central rituals of
the planter elite that dominated Southern society. 1' 1 This did not
mean dueling was legalized. Even as it was gaining favor, Southern
states passed an array of new anti-dueling laws. 132 These laws not
only punished duelists, but were carefully designed both to dis-
honor duelists and to interrupt the steps leading to a duel.133 Be-
cause Southern duels were so carefully choreographed, and carried
such meaning for both participants and observers, it is useful to
sketch out the rituals that attended a duel.
As historians have noted, the duel was not merely pitched
combat between two opponents, but one element of a well-
understood ritual, the "affair of honor." 134 It had its own set of
rules, the code duello. 35 The law itself took cognizance of the care-
128. See Freeman, Dueling as Politics, supra note 103, at 316.
129. See GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 344-45 (1992).
130. See id.
131. See STOWE, supra note 1, at 5.
132. See David Roberts Lewis, Dissent to Dueling- Arguments Against the Code Duello in
America 25-51 (1984) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Vanderbilt University) (on file at the Vanderbilt
University Library), for an excellent overview of the legal acts passed against dueling in the
United States. See also infra text accompanying notes 142-62.
133. See Lewis, supra note 132.
134. See STOWE, supra note 1, at 5-49; JOHN LYDE WILSON, THE CODE OF HONOR, OR RULES
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF PRINCIPALS AND SECONDS IN DUELLING (1838) (printed as an adden-
dum to JACKK. WILLIAIS, DUELING INTHE OLD SOUTH (1980)). See generally AYERS, supra note
104, at 9-33 (examining the duel and its place as a central "social drama" of the South);
GREENBERG, supra note 113, at 23-41 (same); WYATT-BROWN, supra note 104, at 349-61 (1982)
(same).
135. See WILSON, supra note 134, at 87.
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ful formality of a duel, distinguishing between a duel and an "af-
fray," the latter being a clash springing up when two (or more) men
quarreled and decided to fight then and there.136
The affair most often began with some incident between two
men in which one felt insulted by (or chose to take offense at) the
words or deeds of the other. 137 This was followed by an exchange of
letters, in which the man who took insult demanded the other ei-
ther explain why his slight was not an insult, or apologize for the
comment or incident. 138 If these letters did not produce an apology
or satisfactory explanation, each man would then appoint "seconds,"
friends charged with arranging the duel. 139 Only after all these
steps transpired-insult, exchange, challenge, acceptance, ar-
rangement-would the duel itself take place. In most instances, the
affair never reached the dueling stage, as the two men involved
reached an understanding and resolved their disagreement without
combat.140
Woven into the "affair of honor" was the concept that un-
derlay and motivated duels: honor, or rather a particularly South-
ern version thereof.'4 ' The concept of honor has little resonance for
modern Americans, 42 but to antebellum Southerners it was a cen-
tral feature of their civilization. 43 In the culture of the old South, a
white man's honor was measured not by what he thought of him-
136. See Payne v. State, 391 So. 2d 140, 143-44 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) ('A duel, as the term
is ordinarily understood ... is the fighting together of two persons by previous concert with
deadly weapons to settle some antecedent quarrel, and has none of the elements of sudden heat
and passion."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (6th ed. 1990); IV BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at
*145.
137. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hart, 29 Ky. 119 (1831) (discussing a case in which the
challenger accused an opponent of associating with "a negro"); State v. Farrier, 8 N.C. 487, 488
(1821) (a challenge that began when one combatant told the other, "I would as soon vote for Jim,
the barber, as you"). On the mechanics of a duel, see WILSON, supra note 134, at 91-92. Wilson's
work was widely read in the South and accepted as an good account of the duel. See GREENBERG,
supra note 113, at 82; STOWE, supra note 1, at 6.
138. See WILSON, supra note 134, at 91-95.
139. See id. at 93. Wilson also urged seconds to do what they could to head off the duel. See
id.
140. See STOWE, supra note 1, at 10.
141. See AYERS, supra note 104, at 12-14; see also WYATT-BROWN, supra note 104, at 363.64,
passim.
142. That said, many Southerners still are deeply influenced by inherited notions of honor
and insult. See generally Fox BUTTERFIELD, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN: THE BOsKET FAMILY AND THE
AMERICAN TRADITION OF VIOLENCE 1-12, passim (1995) (examining the heritage of violence in
one Southern family); RICHARD E. NISBETT & Dov COHEN, CULTURE OF HONOR: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF VIOLENCE IN THE SOUTH 4-12 (1996) (comparing modern-day Southerners' and
Northerners' responses to insults and slights).
143. See AYERS, supra note 104, at 9-33.
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self, but by what others thought of him.144 As one anthropologist
explains it, in a society with such a view of honor "the being and
truth about a person are identical with the being and truth that
others acknowledge in him."145 Thus the need for Southern men to
participate in the "affair of honor," even when morally opposed to
dueling. The point of a duel was not to reaffirm one's self-worth, but
to demonstrate that worth to others.146
Honor was not a quality that could be repaired through the
legal system. 147 For a man to turn to the legal system to repair his
honor, perhaps by filing a libel or slander suit, was akin to a man
admitting that he was unable to protect himself.148 It was an ad-
mission of both weakness and cowardice. 49 A libel suit also carried
the message that the plaintiff was one who thought his honor could
be repaired by monetary damages.1 50 The Southern attitude toward
honor, personal transgressions, private violence, and the law is
probably best summarized by a famous piece of advice given to An-
drew Jackson by his mother. As he recalled it, she advised Jackson:
"Never tell a lie, nor take what is not your own, nor sue anybody for
slander, assault and battery. Always settle them cases yourself."15'
The duel, then, was the product of a culture where a gentle-
man's worth needed constantly to be communicated to others. Its
rituals were designed to demonstrate that the duelists were both
gentlemen. No surprise, then, that duels were most often fought
between men who were in the public eye and whose exact social
status was often in question: journalists and lawyers.1 52 Men in
such professions were particularly likely to suffer if they lost public
favor. They were also, however, likely to benefit if they won their
144. See id. at 13.
145. Id. (quoting Pierre Bourdieu, The Sentiment of Honor in Kabyte Society, in HONOUR AND
SHAME: THE VALUES OF MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY 212 (J. G. Peristiany ed., 1966)).
146. In this sense, dueling fits well with Eric Posner's notion that an important function of
social norms is to signal to others that the participant is of a good type, deserving trust in trans-
actions. See POSNER, supra note 28, at 19-22; see also Warren F. Schwartz et al., The DueL" Can
these Gentlemen be Acting Efficiently?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 320, 321-53 (1984).
147. See, e.g., F. D. SRYGLEY, SEVENTY YEARS IN DIXE: RECOLLECTIONS OF AND SAYINGS OF
T. W. CASKEY AND OTHERS 310 (1893) ('Questions affecting personal character were rarely re-
ferred to courts of law ... To carry a personal grievance into a court of law degraded the plain-
tiff in the estimation of his peers and put the whole case below the notice of society."), quoted in
WImiAMS, supra note 134, at 25; see also text accompanying notes 60-61.
148. See id.
149. See GREENBERG, supra note 113, at 39; HINDUS, supra note 127, at 43 ('At bottom, it
was these [legal] proceedings that were objectionable.").
150. See GREENBERG, supra note 113, at 39.
151. Charles Synor, The Southerner and the Laws, 6 J. S. HIST. 12 (1940).
152. See AYERS, supra note 104, at 17.
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duels and so gained attention. Indeed, some men entered into duels
precisely to establish their claim to the status of a gentleman. 15 3
So inflexible was the equation of dueling with honor that
many a man personally opposed to dueling still engaged in duels.
One Mississippi congressman explained that he would have to re-
spond to a challenge, for if he turned it down "life will be rendered
valueless to him, both in his own eyes and in the eyes of the com-
munity."154 Another commentator explained why one reluctant du-
elist entered a fray: "[To have declined would have disgraced him
here [and] destroyed his just weight [and] influence."'155 The Vir-
ginia statesman John Randolph reconciled his conscience with the
demands of public opinion in his famous 1826 duel with Henry Clay
by accepting a challenge but then resolving not to fire at his oppo-
nent.156
The only sure way for a gentleman to refuse to duel and keep
his honor was if he had a long-established reputation for piety. 157
Late-found religion was not enough; one had to have publicly dem-
onstrated a deep religious faith well before the challenge was is-
sued. Such public profession of faith would serve to shield one from
the claim that he was refusing to duel simply out of fear. 158
Other than this, a Southern gentleman, once challenged,
faced the choice of either entering the duel or risking expulsion
from polite society. 15 9 Many southerners condemned dueling, and
153. See id. at 16-17; WOOD, supra note 128, at 345 C'Sometimes it appeared that in Amer-
ica's fluid society would-be gentlemen were using challenges as a means of establishing their
status or their dignity.").
154. GREENBERG, supra note 113, at 37 (quoting Mississippi congressman and avid duelist S.
S. Prentiss).
155. Id. (regarding an 1845 duel).
156. See KENNETH S. GREENBERG, HONOR & SLAVERY 59 (1996). When Randolph got to the
dueling-ground, he changed his mind. See id. at 60-62.
157. Thus, United States Senator Barnwell Rhett was able to refuse a challenge by remind.
ing his would-be opponent that "[ior twenty years I have been a member of the Church of Christ.
The Senator knows it; everyone knows it. I cannot and I will not dishonor my religious profes-
sion." See TRUMAN, supra note 93, at 16.
158. There are instances where gentlemen refused to duel and still managed to maintain
their honor, see id. at 434-47, but the instances where this occurred appear to have been un-
usual, for instance when a challenged duelist had killed a previous opponent, see id. at 438, or
when the challenger was clearly far below the challenged's social status, see WOOD, supra note
128, at 345.
159. The great social cost of refusing a duel, the relatively small chance an "affair of honor"
would result in death, and the reputational benefits of a duel, have led some scholars to ask
whether Southern gentlemen were acting "efficiently" in engaging in dueling. See Schwartz et
al., supra note 146, at 321-53. Asking whether it was rational for individuals to duel is not the
same, however, as asking whether dueling as an institution was rational or beneficial. For one
author's speculations on whether dueling was ever efficient, see Eric Posner, Law, Economics,
and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1697, 1736-40 (1996).
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regretted the practice's position in their region. 160 When the time
came for action, however, the vast majority of them hewed to the
pro-dueling norm.161
B. The South's Anti-Dueling Laws
1. The Law as Written
Beginning around 1800, Southern states passed an array of
laws designed not merely to punish dueling, but to sever the link
between dueling and social approval. It is important to remember
that dueling was always illegal in the South; under the common
law, duelists could be held for charges ranging from incitement to
murder, depending on how far the duel progressed. 62 The new laws
went beyond meting out punishment. As one contemporary com-
mentator perceptively noted, they "were intended to apply to the
most common causes of duels, and to turn these very causes into
strong motives against practicing such combats, or any of their an-
tecedent methods."163
The earliest laws sought to cut the tie between dueling and
honor by banning duelists from the mark of public favor-public
office. 16 It was an old idea; both Massachusetts and Connecticut
had disqualified duelists from holding political office since before
the Revolution. 165 In the South, such provisions became common in
the years around 1800. In 1799, Kentucky banned duelists from
160. Thus, Southerners would condemn dueling in the abstract and even, in rare instances,
join anti-dueling societies allegedly devoted to stamping out the practice. See WILLIAS, supra
note 134, at 66. The societies, however, apparently did little good. The English writer Harriett
Martineau, traveling through the south in the 1830s, spoke of the Anti-Dueling Society formed in
New Orleans: "A Court of Honor was instituted [by the society] for the restraint of [dueling]; of
course, without effectual result Its functioning degenerated into choosing weapons for combat-
ants, so that it ended by sanctioning, instead of repressing, dueling." HARRIET MARTINEAU, 3
SOCiETY IN AMERICA 56 (1837), quoted in WII22AMS, supra note 134, at 65.
161. Because Southerners dueled regularly and ostracized men who refused a challenge from
a fellow gentleman, it makes sense to speak of the South's pro-dueling social norm, even though
many professed to be horrified at dueling.
162. See generally Baird, supra note 83.
163. Robert Reid Howison, Duelling in Virginia, 4 WM. & MARY Q. 215, 222-23 (1924). This
is drawn from Howison's (1820-1906) unpublished memoirs; he was a witness to many duels and
related to several famous duelists.
164. See GREENBERG, supra note 113, at 15 (discussing punishments: "There are similarities
among the stake through the heart, the gibbet, and the disqualification from office: all are ways
of dishonoring a person in a culture of honor").
165. See Greene, supra note 70, at 387.
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holding public office, 166 followed by North Carolina in 1802,167 Ten-
nessee in 1809,168 and Virginia in 1810.169 Two years later South
Carolina enacted a similar law which not only barred duelists and
their seconds from holding public office, but banned them from
practicing law, medicine, "or any other trade or calling
whatsoever."170 Similar laws soon appeared on the books in Illinois
(1815), 171 Georgia (1816),172 Alabama (1819), 173 and eventually Mis-
sissippi (1822),174 and the District of Columbia. 175 Mississippi 176 and
Kentucky 77 were among the states that also placed prohibitions in
their state constitutions allowing duelists to be barred from public
office.
In their attempts to put roadblocks in the path to the duel,
lawmakers did not neglect to criminalize the conduct of seconds,
who arranged duels and ensured that they were carried out ac-
cording to the "code of honor."'7 8 A duel was, after all, not merely a
fight between two combatants, but a carefully arranged ritual that
required the assistance of many "stage-managers."179 Under the
common law, when one combatant died in a duel, all the seconds, on
either side, were guilty of murder. 180 Several states included sec-
onds in their statutes, and Georgia's statute covered not only duel-
ists but also anyone "consenting to be a second in a duel to be
fought with sword, or pistol or other deadly weapon." 181 Missis-
sippi's 1839 anti-dueling law not only forbid duelists and seconds
166. See J. Winston Coleman, Jr., The Code Duello in Ante-Bellum Kentucky, 30 FILSON
CLUB HIST. Q. 125, 127 (1956).
167. See FRANKLIN, supra note 40, at 58 (citing N.C. CODE §§ 203-11 (1855)).
168. See TENN. CODE § 5 (1809).
169. See 1 VA. CODE REV. § 8 (1819), quoted in Chaffin v. Lynch, 1 S.E. 803, 806 (Va. 1887).
170. FRANKLIN, supra note 40, at 58 (quoting 5 S.C. STAT. AT LARGE 671-72 (1839)); see also
Yancey v. State, 29 S.C.L. (2 Speers) 246 (S.C. App. L. 1843).
171. See Lewis, supra note 132, at 36.
172. See Harris v. Georgia, 58 Ga. 332, 332 (1877) (citing LAMAR'S DIGEST 593 (1816)).
173. See Lewis, supra note 132, at 39.
174. Mississippi only passed its anti-dueling law in 1822, as one proposed in 1817 failed to
pass the legislature by a vote of 37-6. See Wilmuth S. Rutledge, Dueling in Antebellum Missis-
sippi, 26 J. MISS. HST. 183 (1964).
175. APPLEBY, supra note 24, at 45.
176. See MISS. CONST. of 1835, art. VI, § 2 (banning "the evil practice of dueling").
177. See KY. CONST. of 1850, art. VIII, § 1 (requiring an officeholder to swear an oath that he
has never participated in a duel).
178. See, for example, WILSON, supra note 134, at 89-90, for an account of the many tasks
seconds had to perform to ensure that an "honorable" duel took place.
179. See id.
180. See IV BLACKSTONE, supra note 62, at *199.
181. GA. CODE (LAMAR'S DIGEST) 517 (1816), cited in Harris v. Georgia, 58 Ga. 332, 332
(1877).
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from holding public office, but placed the same penalties on at-
tending surgeons. 8 2 Exceeding all of these statutes in scope, Ala-
bama's 1819 law fined and excluded from public office not only du-
elists and seconds but "every person or persons directly or indi-
rectly concerned therein."18 3
From the first, these laws faced problems in being
enforced.l 4 When Tennessee updated its anti-dueling law in 1817,
for instance, the new law's preamble explained the change by stat-
ing that the earlier laws were "found by experience to be ineffectual
to prevent a practice so generally condemned by the more thinking
part of society."18 5 Yet the new law, too, had little effect on dueling;
the top ranks of Tennessee politics continued to be filled by men
who had engaged in duels, including Tennessee's foremost politician
of the era, Andrew Jackson. 86 Why did these laws fail? In some
cases, the laws themselves were sops to vocal minorities opposed to
dueling, and their passage did not signal any change in the major-
ity's actual tolerance of the practice. 8 7 A prime example is South
Carolina's anti-dueling law. The legislature adopted it in 1812, fol-
lowing a campaign led by the evangelist Philip Moser, who also
authored the state's first statute that made it illegal to kill a
slave.188 The legislature was at best, however, lukewarm about the
law, and South Carolina's political elite never intended it to be en-
forced. 8 9 It was signed into law by a governor who was himself a
veteran duelist. 90 A decade later, South Carolinians twice elected
as governor John Lyle Wilson, author of the classic guide to the
182. See Rutledge, supra note 174, at 185.
183. Smith v. State, 1 Stew. 506, 506 (Ala. 1828) (quoting the Alabama Act of 1819); see also
State ex rel. v. Du Bose, 13 SAV. 1088, 1090 (Tenn. 1890) (noting that the Tennessee Constitution
of 1835 punishes not only duelists but an "aider or abettor" in duels as well).
184. See FRANKLIN, supra note 40, at 59; JACK KENNY WILLIAMS, VOGUES IN VILL'.NY: CRIME
AND RETRIBUTION IN ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA 38 (1957).
185. TENN. CODE § 84 (1817), quoted in Lewis, supra note 132, at 31.
186. See James IV. McKee, Jr., Dueling, in TENNESSEE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HISTORY AND
CULTURE 264-65 (Carroll Van West ed., 1999).
187. See, e.g., Dueling, 7 PA. L.J. 45, 47 (1847) ('Most of the state constitutions which have
been framed or remodeled within the last twenty years contain clauses declaring the severest
penalties against fighting duels. In the legislatures of perhaps every one of these states are to be
found men who have been so engaged.").
188. See WILLIS, supra note 134, at 66.
189. See Yancey v. State, 29 S.C.L (2 Speers) 246, 249 (S.C. App. L 1843) ('The Act of 1812
... of course encountered many covert prejudices, and the pens most skillful in the preparation
of Acts of the Legislature were withheld from the noble and philanthropic service which was then
tendered to them. The work was left to be perfected by a physician unskilled in the law, but his
heart bled for suffering humanity.").
190. See NILIAMS, supra note 184, at 37 ("The duelling laws ... had no obvious loopholes.
They needed none, for they simply were not enforced.").
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code duello, The Code of Honor.191 South Carolina was not alone in
hypocrisy; the governor who signed into law Georgia's anti-dueling
statute, for instance, was also a duelist.192
Even assuming some of the laws were sincere attempts to at
least express dissatisfaction with dueling, 193 the lawmakers who
passed them lacked the will to enforce them. Legislatures that re-
quired anti-dueling oaths frequently exempted newly elected duel-
ists from the oath. Mississippi granted an amnesty to one newly
elected delegate in 1838 and granted amnesty to fifteen more new
legislators in 1858,194 while Alabama's legislature issued similar
exemptions in 1841, 1846, and 1848.11 Another tactic was simply to
change the date after which an oath would become effective, so that
an old duel would not prevent a legislator from taking his seat. 196 In
Kentucky, something of a prodigy in this area, the legislature
changed the effective date of its anti-dueling oath no fewer than 15
times between 1821 and 1848.197
These examples expose a deeper problem with attempts to
change social norms by legal means: how can legal institutions
which depend heavily on public support, enforce laws that strike at
widely shared values? As Alexander Hamilton noted in his apologia,
success in politics often means adjusting to public prejudices. 198
Passing laws against dueling was one thing, for it fit with the dis-
comfort many in the South felt about dueling. 199 Enforcing these
laws, however, would strike directly at the belief that it was some-
times necessary for men to duel to maintain their honor. Thus, no
surprise that politicians dependent on public favor did not rush to
put such laws into effect.
The more interesting legal attacks on dueling were not those
that directly challenged the institution. In addition to the punish-
191. WILSON, supra note 134, at 89.
192. See STEVENS, supra note 25, at 38 (stating that Georgia's law "was dead in the water
from the minute the ink of the Governor's signature was dry").
193. It appears, for instance, that several of the Southern Senators who voted for the District
of Columbia's anti-dueling law in 1838 did so not because they expected it would be strictly on.
forced, but because it would express disapproval and might sway public opinion. See text accom-
panying notes 15-21 Among those voting in favor of the law, for instance, was Henry Clay, an
experienced duelist. See TRUMAN, supra note 93, at 77.
194. See Rutledge, supra note 174, at 190.
195. See WILLIAMS, supra note 134, at 66-68.
196. See Lewis, supra note 132, at 34.
197. See id.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
199. See FRANKLIN, supra note 40, at 59-60; Synor, supra note 151, at 17. See generally
Lewis, supra note 132.
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ments that attempted to expel duelists from public office, and so
mark their duels as dishonorable, antebellum lawmakers proposed
a range of laws intended to interrupt the steps that led to a public
combat. 2 0 They broadened libel laws considerably to give an in-
suited party redress apart from the "affair of honor." Mississippi
and Virginia expanded their libel laws to make illegal any state-
ment likely to lead to violence. 201 Virginia's act, first passed as part
of the 1810 Anti-Dueling Act, made actionable "all words which
from their usual construction and common acceptation are consid-
ered as insults, and lead to violence and breach of the peace."2°2 So
stringent was Virginia's law that, unlike ordinary libel laws, it
sometimes punished "fighting words" even when they were true.203
Some laws were also changed to protect men who refused to duel. In
1832, Florida made it an offense to call a man a coward for refusing
to duel.204
The evidence suggests that these laws did not succeed any
better than those which attempted to ban duelists from public
life.20 5 Dueling did not noticeably decline in the years after these
laws were passed, nor did the prejudice against bringing libel suits
disappear.206 In the rare cases where suits were brought, juries
proved unwilling to convict one gentlemen for libeling another, ap-
parently agreeing with the general view that a gentleman should
defend his honor outside of the courtroom. 207 In the state with the
most stringent libel law, Virginia, only a handful of statutory libel
cases were reported before 1865.208
200. An idea they may have derived from Blackstone, who wrote that dueling would not end
"till a method be found of compelling the original aggressor to make some other satisfaction to
the affronted party, which the world shall esteem equally reputable? IV BLACSONE, supra
note 62, at *199.
201. See John W. Wade, Tort Liability for Abusihe and Insulting Language, 4 VAND. L REV.
63, 82-84 (1950). Mississippi's statute, in particular, was clearly designed to deter fighting words,
so much so that it was later held no action could be brought against a corporation under the law,
as a corporation was unable to participate in personal violence. See id. at 83.
202. VA. ACTS ch. 10, § 8 (1810), quoted in Wade, supra note 201, at 83.
203. See Moseley v. Moss, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 534, 540 (1850) (holding that truth was not an
absolute defense under Virginia's "statutory libel" laws, though it was under common law libel).
204. Herbert J. Doherty, The Code Duello in Florida, 29 FLA. HIST. Q. 243, 245 (1951).
205. But see WILLIAMS, supra note 134, at 70-71 (arguing that the rise in libel suits in South
Carolina after the passage of that state's anti-dueling law in 1812 is a sign the law channeled
some disputes into the legal system).
206. See GREENBERG, supra note 113, at 14-15.
207. See Rorabaugh, supra note 114, at 16.
208. See Wade, supra note 201, at 83-84 nn.131o54 (discussing Virginia statutory libel law).
In contrast, after the 1880s, when dueling had largely disappeared, the number of reported libel
cases appears to have risen. See id.
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The insult was, however, only the first step to the duel.209
The laws were designed to interrupt every step leading to a duel.
Challenges to dueling were often criminalized in the same statutes
that prohibited dueling itself.210 Alabama's 1819 anti-dueling provi-
sion forbid "sending, giving, accepting, or conveying any such chal-
lenge," and not only banned the challenger from public office, but
sentenced him to three months in jail and a $2,000 fine. 211 Making a
challenge was similarly banned by the anti-dueling acts adopted in
Georgia,2 12 Kentucky,213 North Carolina, 214 South Carolina, 215 and
Tennessee. 21 6
To summarize, by the 1820s every Southern state had
adopted laws or Constitutional provisions intended not merely to
punish duelists but to strike at the internal and external pressures
that led so many men to duel. The laws made illegal insults likely
to provoke violent reactions. They forbade men from issuing chal-
lenges to duels. They banned seconds from even carrying chal-
lenges, much less arranging duels. For convicted duelists, the law
promised not only criminal punishment but official ostracism-ex-
clusion from public office-a ban that would tarnish any duelist's
claim to be a "gentleman." If the laws had worked as designed, con-
flict would have been avoided or channeled into the judicial system.
Dueling would have been transformed from a social drama in which
duelists displayed and confirmed their "honor," to a profoundly dis-
honorable custom, engagement in which would permanently dam-
age the honor of any Southern gentleman.
209. See STOWE, supra note 1, at 13-14.
210. Some courts also held that making a challenge was illegal under the Common Law. See
Brown v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. (1 Rand.) 516 (1826).
211. See Smith v. State, 1 Stew. 506 (Ala. 1828) (holding, apparently against the language of
the statute, that Alabama's anti-dueling act of 1819 criminalized challenges only when actually
followed by a duel).
212. See GA. CODE (LAMAR'S DIGEST) 593 (1816), quoted in Harris v. Georgia, 58 Ga. 332, 333
(1877).
213. See Moody v. Commonwealth, 61 Ky. (1 Met.) 1, 3 (1862).
214. See State v. Farrier, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 487, 489 (1821) (noting that sending a challenge
was illegal under both the Common Law and North Carolina's 1802 anti-dueling statute).
215. See State v. Strickland, 11 S.C.L. (2 Nott & McC.) 181, 183 (1819) ("The law makes
every challenge to fight a duel... penal.").
216. See Smith v. State, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 228, 232 (1829) (citing the Tennessee Act of 1809
which bans not only dueling but "bearing a challenge for that purpose.").
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2. The Laws as Enforced
The laws designed to prohibit dueling rarely worked. Their
enforcement relied too heavily on men deeply embedded in the very
social practices the laws sought to overturn. Seldom were dueling or
even murder charges brought against duelists.2 7 When they were,
Southern judges and juries, drawn from the populace and presuma-
bly sharing the beliefs of the wider society, were unwilling to en-
force the harshest of the anti-dueling laws.218 Duelists appeared
largely immune from prosecution.219
Reluctance to enforce the laws took a variety of forms. In
more than one instance, state supreme courts gutted anti-dueling
statutes by reading them so narrowly as to make them unenforce-
able. In Smith v. State, Alabama's Supreme Court held that the
state's anti-dueling law only banned challenges when followed by
an actual duel-thus holding that simply issuing a challenge was
not illegal under the law.220 The South Carolina Supreme Court re-
lied on the privilege against self-incrimination to hold in 1819 that
seconds in duels could not be compelled to testify about a duel.
Given the private nature of duels, this holding made it extremely
difficult to prosecute duelists.221 In a particularly creative reading
217. In the antebellum South, there were only a small number of reported cases in which
criminal charges were leveled for either dueling or homicide in connection with a duel One
study found a total of only seventeen published appellate cases dealing with antidueling laws in
the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia, in the years before 1860. Schwartz et al., supra
note 146, at 327 n.23.
218. See VT1Ams, supra note 134, at 66-67 (regarding general unwillingness to enforce
anti-dueling laws); see also ARIELAJ. GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER: SLVERY AND WmSrERY IN THE
ANTEBELLum SOUTHERN COURTROOM 30, 37 (2000) (examining the background of judges and
jurors in Mississippi).
219. In the rare instances where duelists were punished, it appears most were fined for their
actions. SeeWILUAM, supra note 184, at 37. Intriguingly, out of the small number of published
appellate cases, in several the laws were invoked either against men who either were not gen-
tlemen, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Dudley, 33 Va. (6 Leigh) 613, 613 (1835) (concerning the
indictment of a "common laborer" for aiding and abetting in a duel), or who acted in utter igno-
rance of the code duello when making a challenge, see, e.g., Ivey v. State, 12 Ala. 276, 276 (1847)
(prosecution under anti-dueling laws of an individual who told the other party he had "half a
minute" to prepare for a duel); Commonwealth v. Tibbs, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 524. 524 (1833) (defen-
dant charged with dueling when he told another party, "I will fight you a duel with a pistol or a
rifle, from one step to a hundred yards"); Strickland, 11 S.C.L at 181 (defendant charged with
violating dueling laws after urging another to "go into the old field to fight a duet'). These sug-
gest that even when enforced, anti-dueling laws may have been disproportionately enforced
against non-elites.
220. See Smith v. State, 1 Stew. 506, 507 (Ala. 1828).
221. Duels were publicized, but they were not open to the public. See State v. Edwards, 11
S.C.L (2 Nott & McCord) 13, 15 (1819). Edwards was a test case of the anti.dueling laws; as one
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of the law, in 1860 California's Supreme Court held that the state
legislature, in passing an anti-dueling law that set a punishment of
five years' imprisonment for a duelist who killed his antagonist,
had thereby superseded the state's murder law.222 In other words,
the court held that by passing the anti-dueling statute the Califor-
nia legislature had declared that killing a man in a duel was not
murder. 223
Juries presented an even bigger stumbling-block to the en-
forcement of anti-dueling laws.2 24 Drawn to be representative of the
larger community, a jury would, one assumes, always be a weak
link in enforcing any punitive legislation aimed at altering a
broadly held social norm.225 The accused was to be punished for en-
gaging in activity that was expected of members of society. Dueling
was an especially tough issue in this regard, for even men who dis-
approved of dueling often felt compelled to duel.226
Even in instances where the authorities investigated the
duel and a grand jury issued indictments against duelists and sec-
onds, petit juries would only rarely convict accused duelists at
trial.2 27 In acquitting duelists, the petit jury gave voice to the gen-
eral opinion that, however pernicious dueling was, it should not be
a criminal offense. 228 It was this refusal by juries to convict duelists
historian has written, once the judge in the case refused to require seconds to testify, "the duel-
ing laws became moot." WILLIAMS, supra note 134, at 68. The law was altered in 1823 to give
seconds immunity while testifying. See HINDUS, supra note 127, at 44.
222. See People ex rel. Terry v. Bartlett, 14 Cal. 652, 653 (1860) (holding that under Califor-
nia law a duelist, in this case former state Chief Justice David Terry, who killed an opponent
was not guilty of murder but the separate offense of violating the state's anti-dueling law).
223. See id. California was settled by many Southerners in the 1840s and 1850s, saw quite a
few duels, and was the site of one of the most famous duels in the nation: the 1859 duel where
David S. Terry, the Kentucky-born Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, killed United
States Senator David Broderick. Terry did not hear People ex rel. Terry, but his position might
help explain why California's Supreme Court held as it did. See id.; STEVENS, supra note 25, at
228-44.
224. Both case law and secondary works abound with tales of men indicted for a dueling.
related crime, only to be quickly acquitted by a jury at trial. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 166,
at 133 (following a fatal Kentucky duel in 1829, the surviving duelist was acquitted by a jury
that deliberated less than five minutes); Howison, supra note 163, at 230 (following a fatal duel
in Virginia, a warrant was issued and the surviving duelist arrested, but "on hearing the evi-
dence [the jury] promptly acquitted him"). Southerners' refusal to convict duelists was also cited
by Northern critics of the institution. See Lewis, supra note 132, at 46.
225. Juries were not perfectly representative of Southern white society, but in at least some
instances petit juries were drawn from broad cross-sections of the dominant society. See GROSS,
supra note 220, at 37; see also HINDUS, supra note 127, at 89-91 (noting that the jury trial was
"the only stage from arrest to punishment in which public opinion is directly involved").
226. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
227. See infra text accompanying notes 231-35.
228. See WILLIAMS, supra note 184, at 38.
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that lay behind some states' adoption of an anti-dueling oath for
legislators and voters.229 In Dwight v. Rice, an 1850 case, the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana justified that state's oath by pointing out
that it was the only way to tame duelists, as juries would never
punish them.230
It is tempting to see such activities as a nineteenth-century
instance of jury nullification, occasions where jurors expressed their
disagreement with a law by refusing to convict those charged with
violating it. 2 1 In fact, the situation was complicated considerably
by the fact that, even as petit juries were proving themselves un-
willing to convict men accused of dueling, grand juries were often
willing to indict them for the offense. In South Carolina, grand ju-
ries indicted several duelists for murder.232 South Carolina law,
however, allowed petit juries to find that a homicide was either
"felonious, justifiable, or excusable," and when dealing with duel-
ists, they usually chose the latter two categories. 233 In Vicksburg,
Mississippi, during the antebellum era, grand jurors returned forty
indictments charging men with dueling or aiding in a duel.3 4 Only
two of those indicted in Vicksburg ever came to trial, however, and
both were speedily acquitted.235 The grand and petit jurors' actions
here recapitulated Southerners' ambiguous relationship with duel-
ing, signaling disapproval of the practice while avoiding punishing
individual duelists.
Only in a few instances did it appear that the anti-dueling
laws had any real deterrent effect at all. The one Southern state
where the laws may have had a noticeable effect on dueling was
Virginia. Virginia's stringent anti-dueling laws, which banned du-
229. See Dwight v. Rice, 5 La. Ann. 580, 581 (1850).
230. The court in Rice contended that the state's 1845 constitution, which prohibited duelists
from voting, had helped deter the practice. Id. at 581-82. As occurred elsewhere, however, Lou-isiana later weakened the prohibition. When it passed a new constitution in 1852, the new char-
ter limited the prohibition to those who had dueled "after the adoption of this Constitution." LA.
CONST. of 1852, § 126.
231. Due to uncertainty about the historical roots of jury nullification, the parallel should not
be pressed. See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L REv. 253, 257
(1996); Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A Skeptical View, 54 TEX. L
REV. 488,498-505 (1985).
232. See WILLIAIS, supra note 184, at 38.
233. Id. Even in South Carolina, however, duelists were occasionally convicted for dueling.
See HINDUS, supra note 127, at 44-45 (noting that, while some duelists were convicted of crimes,
most were never even indicted).
234. See CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, ROOTS OF DISORDER: RACE AND CRIUINAL JUSTICE IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH, 1817-1880, at 190 n.75 (1998). This is probably not representative of dueling
in all the old South; Vicksburg was a major center of dueling in the 1840s. See WILLIMS, supra
note 134, at 8.
235. See WALDREP, supra note 234, at 190 n.75.
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elists from public office and outlawed fighting words, were credited
by some as discouraging dueling in the state, though it is clear the
law did not end the practice of dueling.2 6 The law's exact effect,
though, is not certain; while some claimed the law discouraged du-
elists, many prominent Virginia gentlemen dueled long after the
law's passage,2 7 and dueling in Virginia did not disappear until
1880s. 28
In Tennessee, an unusual campaign against dueling also
served to briefly suppress the institution. Dueling came under at-
tack in the late 1820s, not from legislators but from the Tennessee
Supreme Court. In an 1829 case, Smith v. State, the court relied on
the common law to disbar Calvin Smith, a Tennessee attorney who
had killed an opponent while dueling in Kentucky. 239 In its opinion,
the court warned if any attorney "violates the laws made to sup-
press dueling, we will strike him from the rolls of the Court."240 For
a few years, this appeared to have some effect, discouraging attor-
neys from dueling.241 In the long run, however, its effects were
limited; dueling in Tennessee continued until after the Civil War.242
236. See Howison, supra note 163, at 223 (stating that the Virginia's anti-dueling law was a
"powerful deterrent' against the practice, but also noting that "notwithstanding all these obsta-
cles of human law, duels... have continued in Virginia."). In 1841, one judge of the Supreme
Court of Virginia stated that the law had "repressed" dueling, though it is unclear whether he
meant that it had eliminated dueling or merely discouraged it. Brooks v. Calloway, 39 Va. 477,
471 (1841). There is reason for skepticism about the law's deterrent effect. See infra notes 237-
38.
237. In 1826, some years after Virginia passed its anti-dueling measure, the state's Senator,
John Randolph fought a duel against Senator Henry Clay. See GREENBERG, supra note 156, at
58-61. Randolph's behavior in the duel illustrates how the laws may have affected the behavior
of Virginia gentlemen who nonetheless did not obey the laws. At first, he resolved not to fire at
Clay, in part as a way to "honor" the laws of Virginia (which, of course, outlawed dueling alto.
gether). See id. Once facing Clay, however, Randolph decided he would fire after all. See id. at
60-61. While the anti-dueling law influenced Randolph's behavior, he apparently felt no com-
punction to follow it to the letter.
238. See, e.g., Howison, supra note 163, at 239-40 (discussing duels fought in Richmond in
the 1840s and 1850s); STEVENS, supra note 25, at 14-16 (noting duels that occurred in Virginia in
the 1850s); supra text accompanying notes 287-97 (recounting an outbreak of dueling in Virginia
in the 1880s).
239. Smith v. State, 9 Tenn. (1 Yer.) 228, 229 (1829). In relying on the common law, the court
was able to invoke its own authority to disbar Smith, and thus sidestep the problems facing
other legal institutions that challenged dueling. Id. at 230-31.
240. Id. at 234.
241. See TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: STATE JUDGES AND
SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790-1890, ch. 2 (1999) (discussing the career of John Catron, the
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice who wrote the opinion in Smith). Catron seems to have be-
lieved Smith ended dueling in Tennessee, but dueling continued until the Civil War. See McKee,
supra note 186, at 265-65.
242. See id.
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While anti-dueling laws did not eliminate dueling, they
helped shape the duel. Many duelists took pains to avoid publicly
breaking the law.24 They either kept their duels quiet or, even
more common, dueled beyond the reach of their home state's
laws.24 Crossing state borders was a favorite tactic.2 A5 Under com-
mon law and many statutes, a state's jurisdiction did not extend to
acts committed beyond its borders, so by leaving their state, duel-
ists ensured they would be immune from home state prosecution.4 6
In America, this produced a series of famous dueling-grounds lo-
cated near a state border, ranging from Bladensburg Heights,
across the Maryland line from Washington, D.C., to Cumberland
Island, Georgia, a favorite dueling-ground for Floridians.4 7 Before
the American Indian expulsions, Georgians dueled in that state's
then-sovereign Cherokee territory24
This custom of border crossing might also have had a second,
unintended effect: by forcing duelists to travel to a dueling ground,
the laws gave seconds more time to negotiate a peaceful ending to
what would otherwise have been a violent encounter. This was the
case when, in 1842, Abraham Lincoln became embroiled in a quar-
rel with a political rival, James Shields. m9 Lincoln and Shields were
both from Springfield, Illinois, but following tradition they resolved
to duel out of state, settling on an island in the Mississippi River
that belonged to Missouri.2 50 The long travel time to this island,
however, allowed both men's seconds to arrange a peaceful solution
to the affair-a solution that might never have been reached had
the two dueled in their hometown. 251
Illinois and its duels are worth a second look, for it is the one
state where the law appeared to have stamped out dueling.2 2 While
243. See FRANKLIN, supra note 40, at 47.
244. See id.
245. Id.
246. See Yancey v. State, 29 S.C.L (2 Speers) 246, 248 (S.C. App. L 1843) (stating that while
dueling out-of-state cannot be punished in South Carolina, making a challenge while in-state
does violate the common law); Warren v. State, 14 Tex. 406, 408 (1855) (holding that Texas' anti-
dueling act does not reach individuals who duel out of state); see also Howison, supra note 163, at
237. But see Warren, 14 Tex. at 408 (commenting that Mississippi's anti-dueling act does contain
a provision applying to out-of-state duels).
247. See FRANKLIN, supra note 40, at 47; WILLIMS, supra note 134, at 69-70.
248. See FRANKLIN, supra note 40, at 47.
249. See DOUGLAS L. WILSON, HONOR'S VOICE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF ABRAHAm! LICOLN
265-92 (1998) for a detailed account of this "affair of honor." My thanks to my colleague Tom
Fusonie for this reference:
250. Id. at 280.
251. Id. at 281-82.
252. See Lewis, supra note 132, at 37.
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not a "Southern" state, Illinois was settled in large part by southern
emigrants (witness the Lincolns, who moved there from Kentucky).
With such founders, the state might have been expected to see quite
a few duels, as did other states settled by Southerners such as Cali-
fornia and Texas. Illinois, however, claimed to have had no duels
after 1820.253 This state of affairs owed its existence less to the
state's anti-dueling laws, however, than to the disastrous end of
Illinois's first well-publicized duel.
In 1815, Illinois passed an anti-dueling law that was similar
to those passed elsewhere. It required officeholders to pledge they
had never dueled, but at the same time issued an amnesty to any-
one who had dueled before the new law was passed.254 From this, it
might appear that Illinois was about to follow its Southern counter-
parts, in legislating against dueling while tolerating the practice.
Four years later, however, two men in Belleville, Illinois, Alonze
Stuart and William Bennett, fought the state's first duel, over an
errant horse. 255 The men's seconds, not taking the affair too seri-
ously, planned to turn it into a "mock duel" by loading both duelists'
guns with powder but no shot.256 At the duel, however, when the
signal was given, Bennett fired and Stuart fell dead with a bullet
through the heart.2 57 At Bennett's trial, a witness testified that she
saw him place a bullet in his pistol when his seconds were not
looking.258 Evidently, Bennett had learned of the prank and re-
solved to kill his unarmed opponent. He was convicted of murder
and hanged in 1821.259 According to one observer, the duel and its
aftermath made dueling "discreditible and unpopular, and laid the
foundation for that abhorrence of the practice which had ever been
felt and expressed by the people of Illinois."2 60
Illinois' example points to the complex relationship between
social norms and the law. Its laws were no different from those of
Southern states, and many of its early settlers grew up in the
Southern culture that accepted dueling. Before dueling could win
acceptance in the new territory, however, the Bennett-Stuart duel
253. See TRUMAN, supra note 93, at 78. The Lincoln-Shields affair, which failed to escalate
into a duel, occurred after the events discussed here, suggesting that some remnants of the "af-
fair ofhonor" remained. See supra text accompanying notes 249-51.
254. See Lewis, supra note 132, at 36.
255. See BALDICK, supra note 25, at 124-25.
256. Id. at 124.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 124-25.
260. SABINE, supra note 1, at 289.
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intervened to give the practice a particular meaning. Bennett's be-
havior was anything but "honorable," and his combat with Stuart
was, according to the jury, merely a disguised murder. Nor was
hanging a "gentlemanly" end. More than any legislative enactment,
the Bennett-Stuart duel convinced people in Illinois that dueling
was murder and turned public opinion decisively against the prac-
tice.
The Bennett-Stuart duel also suggests how a particular so-
cial meaning might be established. 26' We can speculate that some
social norms or social meanings that would otherwise be firmly es-
tablished can be cut off, if attacked early or at a strategic
moment.262 In the Southern states, dueling communicated that the
duelist was a man of honor. In Illinois, though, before the duel had
time to take root, it became associated with cold-blooded murder.26
This is not to say that all social norms are amenable to such ma-
nipulation. 264 Indeed, dueling's long career suggests the exact oppo-
site---once the duel was established in Southern culture, it would
take a cataclysm to uproot it.
261. There is already substantial literature speculating how norms develop and acquire par-
ticular meanings. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 28, at 29-32; McAdams, supra note 31, at 352-
355; Picker, supra note 50, at 1225.
262. Considering that Illinois was settled by both Southerners and Northerners, this might
be an example where two social norms, the North's anti-dueling norm and the South's pro-
dueling norm, were competing for dominance until the Bennett-Stuart duel "tipped' opinion in
favor of the anti-dueling norm. See Picker, supra note 50, 1227-28, passim (modeling how in
some instances norms may compete).
263. There are similarities here to the Burr-Hamilton duel. There, however, we can specu-
late that social norms in the North may already have been "tipping," due to the slow growth of
political parties and a more egalitarian social order. See supra text accompanying notes 122-28.
The South's norms were unaffected by such developments, and its norm regarding dueling may
have proven more robust and less amenable to such tipping.
264. A few scholars eager to alter social norms have, it seems, paid insufficient attention to
the fact that some norms are remarkably resistant to change, see, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 41,
at 907-09 (claiming that "existing social conditions are often more fragile than might be sup-
posed"), and have devoted the bulk of their efforts to studying the "norm entrepreneurs" who
played successful roles in altering norms, see David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law 11
(Feb. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Recently, however, Robert Ellickson
has noted that norm entrepreneurs are most likely to be successful if the challenged norm has
already been undermined by exogenous factors, id. (quoting Robert Ellickson, The Evolution of
Social Norms, A Perspective from the Legal Community 29-32 (2000) (unpublished paper)), a
point that anticipates the ones made in this Note, see infra Part V.C.
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V. THE END OF THE AFFAIR
A. The Civil War and the Demise of Dueling
Despite all legal attempts to stamp it out, dueling remained
a part of Southern life on the eve of the Civil War.265 Not only did it
continue to flourish in the Deep South, in its old haunts such as
Charleston, 266 but dueling also appeared in areas that attracted
large numbers of Southern transplants, such as California. 267 Some
students of dueling even contended that dueling increased in the
1850s, as the growing rift between the North and South encouraged
Southerners to embrace such distinctively Southern practices as the
duel.268 Yet, within a decade, the duel was a dying or dead institu-
tion.2 69 Why?
Clearly, the Civil War killed the duel. 270 During the war it-
self, Southern men still dueled, though perhaps at a less frenetic
pace than during the 1850s. 271 Officers in both the Confederate
Army and Navy fought several well-known duels.272 But after the
war, the duel rapidly faded. In South Carolina, for instance, only a
handful of duels were fought after 1865, and only one of those was
fatal.273 Kentucky's last duel took place in 1866.274 Recognizing the
link between the Civil War and dueling's decline does not, however,
explain exactly how the disastrous conflict ended dueling.
Dueling ended in part because the war and its aftermath
served to give a new meaning to dueling. The sheer carnage of the
265. See Coleman, supra note 166, at 138 (antebellum Kentucky); Doherty, supra note 204,
at 243 (antebellum Florida); James T. Moore, The Death of the Duek The Code Duello in Read.
juster Virginia, 1879-1883, 83 VA. MAG. HST. BIOG, 259 (1975) (discussing the duel's continued
vitality in pre-Civil War Virginia). Out of one article's sample of twenty-five "representative
duels" fought in the century between the Revolution and the Civil War, four (16%) took place in
the 1850s. See Schwartz et aL, supra note 146, at 352-55.
266. Several famous duels were fought in Charleston in the 1850s. See FRANKLIN, supra
note 40, at 57; ROSSER H. TAYLOR, ANTE-BELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA: A SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
HISTORY 47 (1942).
267. See STEVENS, supra note 25, at 245.
268. Id. at 245. But see WILLIAMS, supra note 134, at 78-80 (suggesting that dueling in the
South declined somewhat after 1830, though also speaking of the duel's persistence in the
antebellum era).
269. See infra text accompanying notes 277-96.
270. See AYERS, supra note 104, at 271; WILLIAMS, supra note 184, at 37.
271. See STEVENS, supra note 25, at 246-47.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 252-53.
274. See Coleman, supra note 166, at 138-39.
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war destroyed the romantic notions attached to arranged combat.275
By the end of the war, nearly one million of the South's adult white
males had served in the Confederate Army.276 Over a quarter of
them had died in the war, including many of its putative aristo-
crats.27 7 The war itself had appeared to many Confederate soldiers
as a struggle of honor, and losing the war likely made such staged
combat appear both futile and a reminder of losses past.278 After
surviving such slaughter, the returning soldiers must have found
little to attract them to the duel.279 Moreover, the society that ap-
peared after the Civil War and Reconstruction, more urbanized and
commercial, more open to ambitious businessmen, was also less
hospitable to dueling than was the Old South.2 0 A society without
an aristocracy is not one where dueling is likely to flourish. It was
not that the South's culture of honor had disappeared; rather, the
duel was no longer a symbol of that culture. As one Southern pro-
fessor put it in 1883, "[dueling] is no longer an honorable way of
killing."28'
The end of Southern dueling did not mark the end of South-
ern violence.28 2 After the war, as before, Southerners were more
likely to commit murder than their Northern counterparts.2 3
Theirs remained a culture suffused with notions of honor and re-
spect, in which mild personal slights produced disproportionately
violent responses.28 4 But such violence was no longer released in the
275. See AYERS, supra note 104, at 271-72. Mass war seems to render absurd the preten-
sions of the individual duel In similar fashion, World War I ended dueling in Germany, another
society that, in its prewar era, had nurtured a romantic cult of dueling. See FRVERT, supra note
63, at 201-02; KEVIN MCALEER, DUELING: THE CULT OF HONOR IN FIN-DE-SIECLE GERMANY 18
(1994).
276. See JAMES 1VL MCPHERSON, THE BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 306-07
n.41 (1988).
277. See id. at 854 (estimating Southern deaths at above 260,000); id. at 330 (noting that of-
ficers had a higher death rate than enlisted men, and that senior officers had a higher rate over-
all, as, for example, Confederate generals were 50% more likely to be killed than enlisted South-
em men).
278. See JAES M4. MCPHERSON, FOR CAUSE AND COMRADE: WHY MAEN FOUGHT IN THE CIVIL
WAR 168-70 (1997) (discussing the links many Southerners made betv.een the war and honor).
279. See AYERS, supra note 104, at 271.
280. See EDWARD L. AYERS, THE PROMISE OF THE NEW SOUTH 3-25 (1992) (presenting an
overview of the South after the Civil War). The culture was also more like the open one that
developed in the North after 1800 and which contributed to the end of Northern dueling. See
supra note 128 and accompanying text.
281. AYERS, supra note 104, at 268 (citation omitted).
282. See generally BUTTERFIELD, supra note 142; Dov Cohen & Joe Vandello, Meanings of
Vwlence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 567 (1998).
283. See AYERS, supra note 104, at 276.
284. See Cohen & Vandello, supra note 282, at 567.
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duel.285 In the postwar South, as one scholar put it, "aggrieved men
[just] shot each other on sight."286
Only one state saw a revival of dueling after 1870, and that
single outbreak shows how thoroughly dueling had lost its role in
Southern culture. 287 From 1879 to 1883 Virginia was riven by an
extraordinary dispute over the state debt.288 Two factions, "funders"
and "readjusters," fought pitched battles in the state's legislature
and press over how the debt should be settled.289 For now obscure
reasons, participants regarded it as less an ordinary political dis-
pute than a battle over the soul of the State.290 This conflict pro-
duced ten challenges and six duels.291
This time, however, the duel appeared to the public not as
drama but as farce. Law enforcement was no longer willing to turn
a blind eye to duels. When several would-be duelists attempted to
meet and duel in private, they found themselves forced to run from
the Richmond and Washington police.292 Once caught, the duelists
were required by local judges to post large bonds to guarantee their
peaceful behavior, effectively preventing the duel.293 Prominent
public figures no longer felt obliged to follow the code duello. When
United States Senator William Mahone was challenged by former
Confederate General Jubal Early, Mahone simply refused to
fight.29 4 While the antebellum public might have regarded Mahone
as a coward, Virginians in the 1880s did not seem to care about the
dispute, and Mahone suffered no damage to his social standing or
electoral prospects for having declined to duel.2 95
Most telling, even the duelists themselves no longer had
faith in the duel's role as a ritual affirmation of honor. When the
funder George D. Wise challenged readjuster Congressman Ambler
Smith to a duel, Smith announced that his choice of weapons would
be not the traditional dueling pistols but double-barreled
shotguns.2 96 Smith valued the duel not as an arena to publicly dis-
play his honor, but as an opportunity to kill his opponent. The duel
285. See C. VANN WOODWARD, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH 161 (1951).
286. AYERS, supra note 104, at 268.
287. Moore, supra note 265, at 259.
288. See id. at 259-61.
289. Id. at 262.
290. Id. at 264.
291. Id. at 260.
292. Id. at 265, 266, 270.
293. See id. at 265, 270.
294. See id. at 270-71.
295. See id.
296. Id. at 272.
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(thankfully) never took place, and this last vogue for dueling was
soon over.
297
The Virginia controversy brought home a fundamental shift
in attitudes: the social meaning of dueling had changed. It was, to
the general public, no longer a combat for honor but an archaism.
With a new social meaning attached to it, the practice of dueling
disappeared almost completely, helped along by the new willingness
of legal institutions to enforce laws against duelists. By 1883 it was
clear the authorities would arrests duelists, the public was indiffer-
ent to it, and even the duelists themselves no longer believed in it.
After that year, there was never again a major duel in the South.2_3
B. Dueling in Modern American Law
Today, dueling as a legal issue no longer exists. The few
anti-dueling statutes and provisions that remain on the books are
recognized anachronisms, 299 and anti-dueling laws have been in-
voked in only a handful of cases since the turn of the twentieth cen-
tury.300 When they are invoked, it is generally by prosecutors seek-
ing to lay an additional charge against a defendant already charged
with murder or assault.30' Since the 1920s, courts have rejected al-
297. See id. at 273.
298. See id. at 275-76.
299. For example, Tennessee's Constitution still prohibits duelists from holding public office,
TENN. CONST. art. 9, § 3, while anyone who wants to join the Kentucky bar is still required to
pledge they have "not fought a duel with deadly weapons" nor have "sent or accepted a challenge
to fight a duel," KY. CONsT. § 228.
300. There appear to be fewer than a dozen reported cases since 1900 in which a defendant
was charged with violating anti-dueling laws or with committing homicide in a legally cognizable
duel, and many of these cases occurred early in the century. See Payne v. State, 391 So. 2d 140,
144 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (stating that anti-dueling laws are now anachronisms in Alabama);
People v. Morales, 247 P. 221 (Cal. App. 1926) (upholding a conviction for fighting a duel); Bun-
drick v. State, 54 S.E. 683, 684-85 (Ga. 1906) (upholding homicide conviction when two individu-
als, who had planned to meet later for a duel, met earlier, fought, and one was killed); Ward v.
Commonwealth, 116 S.W. 786, 787 (Ky. 1909) (reversing conviction for violating anti-dueling
statute); Baker v. Supreme Lodge, KP., 60 So. 333 (Miss. 1913) (rejecting an insurance com-
pany's contention that insured died in a "duel," not murder, where the insured's policy would
have been invalidated had be died in a duel); Davis v. Modern Woodmen of America, 73 S.W. 923
(Mo. App. 1903) (rejecting an insurance company's contention that insured died in a "duel," not
murder, where the insured's policy would have been invalidated had be died in a duel); State v.
Romero, 801 P.2d 681, 684-85 (NI. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that duels no longer occur); State v.
Fritz, 45 S.E. 957, 958 (N.C. 1903) (upholding a conviction for challenging another to a duel);
Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 648 A.2d 295, 298 n.5 (Pa. 1994) (criticizing a lower court for charac-
terizing a shooting spree as a "duer); Griffin v. State, 274 S.W. 611, 612-13 (Tex- Crim. App.
1925) (holding a duel is a combat "arranged with some formality" and overturning a dueling
conviction); Daughtry v. State, 113 S.W. 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908) (reversing conviction for
sending a challenge under state anti-dueling statute).
301. See, e.g., Payne, 391 So. 2d at 144; Romero, 801 P.2d at 685; Griffin, 274 S.W. at 612.
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most all attempts to charge defendants with violating anti-dueling
laws, recognizing that dueling was not, after all, merely planned
combat, but a complex social ritual that depended on both partici-
pants and observers to give it meaning.30 2 Absent the shared social
understandings that structured the "affair of honor," there is no
true duel. As early as 1909, in Ward v. Commonwealth, the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals recognized that not every fight, even if
agreed to, is a duel.30 3 A duel, the court held, is not just an affray
but "a combat with deadly weapons, fought according to the terms
of precedent agreement and under certain or prescribed rules .
prescribing the utmost formality and decorum."30 4
Such formal combats simply no longer occur in American cul-
ture.3 05 The last reported case in which charges of dueling were
brought against a defendant was a 1990 New Mexico case, State v.
Romero, in which a trial court convicted Romero of dueling after he
and a neighbor quarreled, both left to retrieve weapons, and then
shot one another.30 6 The New Mexico Court of Appeals threw out
Romero's conviction on the dueling charge, reasoning that he could
not have violated the state's anti-dueling laws because formal duels
no longer occur. "[T]his form of combat," the court held, "is long
since dead."307
C. Anti-Dueling Laws and the Management of Social Norms
Dueling may be dead in the law, but it lives on in the imagi-
nation of scholars seeking ways to manage social norms. 08 As noted
above, most of these scholars recognize that, historically, anti-
dueling laws did not eliminate dueling.30 9 Nonetheless, they are at-
tracted to such laws because they see in them a technique by which
laws might alter social norms. Anti-dueling laws did not just aim to
punish duelists, they sought, through a range of methods ranging
302. See supra Part IV.A
303. See Ward, 116 S.W. at 787 (rejecting an attempt to charge a defendant with engaging in
a duel).
304. See id.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 286-97
306. Romero, 801 P.2d at 682.
307. Id. at 684; see also Payne v. State, 391 So. 2d 140, 144 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980) (speaking
of the "extinction" of the duel in Alabama); Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 648 A.2d 295, 298 (Pa.
1994) (criticizing a lower court for, in dicta, describing a gunfight as a "duel").
308. See supra Part II.
309. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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from legislative bars to public humiliation,310 to change the social
norm about, and the social meanings attached to, dueling.311
Modern-day fans of anti-dueling laws have, however, paid
much less attention to why those laws failed.312 Between 1800 and
1860, all Southern states passed laws and constitutional provisions
meticulously and cleverly designed to end dueling, by penalizing
and shaming men who did duel, by providing social support to men
who did not wish to duel, and by disrupting the chain of events that
carried men from a slight to a duel.313 Yet despite these efforts, du-
eling did not die out, and in many parts of the South continued to
flourish. Why did these laws fail, and what does this tell us about
modern attempts to manage social norms and social meanings?
The most direct cause of the laws' failure was the refusal of
state legal actors to.enforce them. Even with anti-dueling laws on
the books, most legislators would not bar duelists from public office,
and most judges and jurors would not convict duelists for dueling-
related offenses.3 14 In refusing to enforce the laws, these officials
were guided by understandings of dueling suffused throughout
their society.3 15 Judges and jurors were, understandably, unwilling
to punish men for dueling when they themselves thought that du-
eling was sometimes necessary to maintain one's honor. The
South's anti-dueling laws had targeted a social norm, but it was a
social norm shared by the men asked to enforce the law. As a result,
it becomes evident why the anti-dueling laws would not be effec-
tively enforced until the social norm itself had changed.3 16
The failure of anti-dueling laws may hold lessons for those
who propose to use the law to manage social norms. Any lesson
drawn from a single example should be taken with a grain of salt;
but it is still worthwhile to close with two admittedly speculative
310. See supra Part IV.B.1.
311. See Lessig, supra note 28, at 681-82.
312. At least one scholar has, however, speculated on the lag between the passage of anti-
dueling laws and the end of dueling. See Posner, supra note 159, at 1736.40.
313. See supra part IV.B.1.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 217-35.
315. Dan MvL Kahan has recently dealt with the similar problem of legal institutions that ref-
use to enforce laws against certain fairly popular social norms. See generally Kahan, supra note
41. Kahan advocates in such instances the use of mild sanctions Cgentle nudges") to alter
"sticky" norms. The examples Kahan gives of norms that prove resistant to legal manipulation,
however, are contested norms such as date rape or drunk driving, for which there is already
considerable societal disapproval. Id. at 607, 609. Dueling in the South was different; while
some expressed dislike of the duel, it was a norm widely tolerated throughout society, resisting
legal attempts to either "nudge" or "shove" out of popularity..
316. See supra Part V.A.
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suggestions about what can be learned from the career of anti-
dueling laws.
First, the failure of anti-dueling laws illustrates the difficul-
ties facing those who advocate a large role for the "expressive func-
tion" of law.317 Some laws, scholars have suggested, can change so-
cial norms not merely by penalizing targeted behaviors but by ex-
pressing society's disapproval of that behavior. 318 Expressive laws
work by making public this shared consensus. Richard McAdams
has suggested that anti-smoking laws may well work chiefly
through their expressive function. 319 Anti-smoking ordinances
passed in the 1980s, he points out, were rarely enforced. They
worked, he proposes, not by punishing smokers directly but by
communicating a new social consensus about smoking.8 20 In effect,
the laws told opponents of smoking that society was on their side.
This emboldened them to speak out, while also letting smokers
know that many others did not like breathing their second-hand
smoke, leading smokers to curb their own behavior. 321 The law
helped change smokers' and nonsmokers' behavior by publicly ex-
pressing an already-forming consensus. 322
The example of anti-dueling laws, however, demonstrates
one limit of this approach. Exactly what a law "expresses" is not
always readily apparent. The problem is not that some laws are not
expressive, for, of course, there are many laws that, because of their
contentious nature, technical subjects, or legislative history, ex-
press no societal consensus at all.323 The problem with "expressive
law" is that many laws' meanings are revealed not in their text but
as they take on life through enforcement.
On the surface, anti-dueling laws' general tone, and the pen-
alties they prescribed, made it appear that there existed in the
South a consensus that condemned duelists. The law as actually
enforced, however, expressed a far different consensus. Courts'
willingness to acquit duelists, and legislatures' willingness to seat
317. See Cooter, supra note 31, at 593-94 (proposing that, under certain circumstances, such
expressive laws can "tip" a society from one social norm to another); Sunstein, supra note 41, at
964 (suggesting that expressive laws may have some effect). It should be noted that all propo.
nents of such "expressive" laws recognize that the laws would work only on certain norms and
would in most cases have only modest effects.
318. See McAdams, supra note 31, at 402.06. See generally, Cooter, supra note 31; Sunstein,
supra note 41.
319. See McAdams, supra note 31, at 404-05.
320. See id. at 405-06.
321. See id.
322. See id. at 402-07.
323. Id. at 403.
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duelists in contravention to the law, expressed a more complex view
of dueling, one that saw the institution as regrettable but held that
the individual duelist was not to be stigmatized.324 The consensus
anti-dueling laws expressed was to be found not in the statute but
in how the statute was enforced (or ignored) by legislators, judges,
and juries.3 25
The disjunction between the laws' text and their enforcement
brings us to a second conclusion: laws aimed at changing a social
norm will likely succeed only if a significant percentage of the
population has already rejected the disfavored norm. This is so not
merely because of the weight of numbers, but because in a demo-
cratic society legal institutions will, albeit to varying degrees, re-
flect the beliefs and habits of the citizens. The more strongly citi-
zens have internalized a particular social norm, the less likely it is
that they will work through their legal institutions effectively to
alter that social norm, even if there are laws on the books against
it.326
The example of the antebellum South illustrates how social
norms can themselves limit the effectiveness of legal institutions
and so blunt attempts to alter those norms.327 Before the Civil War,
the anti-dueling laws went largely unenforced because they at-
tacked a social norm that most members of Southern society toler-
ated or actively supported.3 28 These members of Southern society,
324. See supra Part IV.B.
325. In a different context, Dan Kahan has pointed out that, in a society like our own where
interest groups wield disproportionate power, mere passage of a law, even one intended to be
"expressive," will not signal that there is, in fact, a consensus over the issue. See Kahan, supra
note 41, at 614 (noting that "[c]itizens are likely to form [the impression that the law represents
widespread social consensus] only if they observe their associates complying with, enforcing, or
speaking well of the law").
326. In its broadest form, the proposition that legal change alone can rarely work major so-
cial changes is hardly novel. In the social norms literature, for instance, proponents of "expres-
sive law" see such laws as acting not to transform social norms but rather to "tip" already
changing social norms, often by using the law to let members of society know that the social
norm is, indeed, changing. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 31, at 397-401. More generally, social
scientists have long pointed out the limited power of legal institutions to work social change. For
a good summary of this view, see generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
CouTs BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991).
That being said, the point that deep-rooted social norms can often resist and undercut legal
attempts to alter them is worth making, in large part because some of the more ambitious pro-
ponents of norm management have embraced social norms precisely because they believe they
are amenable to management and alteration. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
327. The problem of how laws can change a genuinely dominant social norm has received lit-
tle attention. But see generally Kahan, supra note 41 (claiming that laws that give "gentle
nudges" may be the best way to change social norms that enjoy significant, though not universal,
social support).
328. See supra Part IV.B.
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unsurprisingly, refused to enforce laws that challenged their own
deeply held beliefs. Following the Civil War, the social norm
changed, as most members of the public concluded that dueling was
not a badge of honor, and therefore abandoned dueling. 29 This new
social norm concerning dueling was a necessary precondition for
strong enforcement of the anti-dueling laws.380
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent years, new interest has grown in "social norms,"
the informal social regularities that society generally agrees its
members should follow. Legal scholars have not only paid new at-
tention to social norms, but have looked for ways in which law can
adjust social norms in order to meet policy goals, or can enlist social
norms to more effectively deter or encourage behaviors. As an ex-
ample of the kind of laws that can effectively manage social norms,
these scholars have pointed to the antebellum South's anti-dueling
laws, which proposed to eliminate dueling not only by punishing
duelists but by changing the social norms concerning duelists and
dueling. These laws sought, by means such as banning duelists
from public office, to sever the link between dueling and honor and
so alter the prevailing social norm. Few believe that the anti-
dueling laws actually had a significant effect on dueling; rather,
they admire the way the laws targeted social norms and see in
them an example for how modern-day laws can effectively alter so-
cial norms.
The actual historical record, however, provides a different
perspective on attempts to use laws to change social norms. While
the South's laws were carefully crafted to change Southerners' per-
ceptions of dueling, and to sever the link between dueling and the
South's pervasive culture of honor, they failed. The legislators,
judges, and jurors charged with enforcing the laws themselves
shared the South's social consensus that dueling was sometimes
necessary to maintain one's honor. As a result, they were unwilling
consistently to punish or stigmatize men for dueling. Dueling was
ended not by laws but by the sweeping social and political impact of
the Civil War.
If history is a guide, many modern-day attempts to use laws
to transform deep-rooted social norms may similarly be doomed to
329. See supra Part V.A.
330. See supra Part V.A.
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failure. Even if laws targeting such entrenched social norms are
passed, they will then have to be enforced by legal actors who share
the consensus concerning the existing social norm. As a result, re-
sistance to the laws is a likely outcome. Far from the law changing
social norms, the example of anti-dueling laws suggests that in
such cases social norms must change before the laws will be en-
forced.
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